ABSTRACT
Surveying the international order in the days after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, Alexander Cadogan, Britain’s most senior Foreign Office civil servant, observed that the world was now witness to two and a half superpowers: the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and Britain acting as the half power.1 For Britain this represented a considerable decline in fortunes. Five years of fighting the totalitarian powers had taken its toll. By agreeing to Lend Lease in 1941 Britain had become economically dependent upon the USA for provisioning the war effort. Whereas in 1938 Britain had been the world’s largest creditor, now she was the largest debtor, owing vast sums to the USA, debts that would not be finally paid off until 2006.2
Britain’s gold reserves had been depleted and sterling as a world currency was at the mercy of the strength of the dollar. Based on these economic indices some observers would have suspected that Cadogan was overly optimistic in even ascribing Britain some degree of world power status. Yet by virtue of having been one of victorious powers, and having carried the battle for so long, Britain had secured a position at the negotiating table that established the parameters of the post-war settlement. Added to this was Britain’s reassertion of control over much of her empire, giving her a global presence that she hoped could not be just ignored by the Americans and Soviets. It was important, one Foreign Office assessment concluded, that ‘Great Britain must be regarded as a world power of the second rank and not merely as a unit in a federated Europe’.3
