ABSTRACT
Some of the earliest studies of social movements explained them as the outcomes of irrational behaviour driven by emotions and amplified collectively through crowds (Le Bon, 1960). This corresponded with a general denigration of the emotions within social sciences, where they were largely naturalised as embodied sensations over which individuals had little control. One could be ‘gripped’ or ‘seized’ by emotions and these feelings were evident physically through a heightened pulse rate, reddened face, shortness of breath etc. In this understanding, emotions were very much of the body and therefore irrational in terms of the classic Cartesian dualism of the mind-body. After the intense cycle of movement mobilisation and protest experienced globally in the late 1960s and early 1970s social movement scholars were very keen to emphasise the rational, political aspect of collective action and to normalise the idea of social movement (see resource mobilisation theory, political opportunity structure). This resulted in the effective exclusion of emotions from mainstream social movement studies, as they were considered unhelpful or irrelevant to the conceptual presentation of social movements as rational and purposive collective actors. The role of emotions in the production of moral values and rational action was therefore effectively ignored in the rush to normalise social movements.
