Conclusion

The political survival approach focusses on political leaders and challengers and their support coalitions or affinity groups as they manage threats to their incumbency and ascendancy. Theorizing about the logic of political survival has primarily been developed for stable democracies and remains in its infancy in other contexts. This book has offered a political survival-based interpretation of extraction choices by incumbents and quasi-state strategies by challengers in Pakistan. This has implications for fiscal structure and governance in Pakistan, and extends the logic of political survival to weak states with heterogeneous societies and fluid polity rules. Theoretical works on political survival and state strength inform each other; this

helps produce a coherent picture for the Pakistani context and beyond. In weak states with strong, fractured societies, political survival drives mechanisms by which state weakness is perpetuated and quasi-states emerge. An expanded logic of political survival also lays out paths whereby weakness is potentially exacerbated to create state collapse and failure, and conversely, whereby the low extraction/ quasi-state emergence cycle may be stalled or altered. Ideology matters in defining affinity groups, and culture can define a socially learned menu for choice, but the chief explanation for decisions related to extraction and quasi-states rests upon the political survival interests that shape leaders and challengers. Existing empirical work has touched on bureaucratic failures and on ethnic and

religious mobilization, but has not systematically explored where by political survival ambitions have shaped strategic choices by leaders and challengers. In an often opaque context, interview insights into the psychological milieu suggest expectations on which decisions are based. Interviews with bureaucrats and informed government observers offer evidence for mechanisms by which state extraction remains weak; interviews with challengers’ affinity group members and observers suggest mechanisms by which quasi-states emerge and are sustained. Secondary accounts and other analyses have provided supplemental evidence. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) assume that tax rates are a key choice determin-

ing incumbent and challenger prospects for political survival and ascendancy; they further suggest that challengers take either “normal” or “revolutionary” paths to office. In Pakistan, rather than the tax rate, it is the tax net, and the general capacity for reallocating resources such as land, that is most consequential. Wars and other

shocks to fiscal requirements have led to more refined international strategies and sometimes to covert money-creation efforts, rather than to dramatic changes in the tax net in Pakistan. In a weakly institutionalized polity, the “normal” and “revolutionary” can be

difficult to distinguish, and challengers in Pakistan have often pursued quasi-state paths. These can take de facto and de jure forms, and may be pursued in tandem with or as an alternative to formally defined, state-supported political offices. Quasi-state strategies produce overlapping and competing jurisdictions and have major implications for governance. A fractured, heterogeneous society, underprovided public goods, and historical learning about negotiable jurisdictions and borders have further fueled quasi-state strategies. From this perspective, secessionist impulses are one point in a continuum of

possible quasi-state behaviors. The “devolution problem” that is frequently referred to in the literature usually does not have a consistent theoretical framework for assessing diverse challengers and their support organizations. Labels such as “ethno-nationalist” carry connotations that can be helpful in some instances but can obfuscate in others. The continuing extractive weakness of the state and emerging quasi-states are mutually reinforcing, contemporaneous processes. This provides coherence and structure to an otherwise chaotic picture. The Pakistani case contributes hypotheses about how the political survival

mechanism operates in weak states with strong, fractured societies. These are listed below in three areas: incumbent leaders’ extraction choices, challengers pursuing quasi-state strategies, and how these two relate to governance. Moreover, these extensions to the logic of political survival enter broader conversations about “external” actors in a polity, Islam and ethnicity, institutional fragility, and political capacity. A key challenge for public goods provision in Pakistan is that a broadbased winning coalition is difficult to generate and sustain. Prescriptions and prognoses for improving governance and development must consider the constraints and opportunities presented by such political survival considerations.