ABSTRACT
On his trip to Baghdad, Noah Feldman, Professor of Law at New York University and Senior Constitutional Adviser to CPA, was surprised to see that most of his fellow travellers were reading books on the reconstruction of Germany and Japan in the wake of the Second World War instead of literature on modern Iraq (Feldman 2006: 1). Indeed, in its reconstruction project in Iraq, the US encountered economic, political, cultural and social conditions that have very little in common with post-Second World War reconstruction efforts; and the exercise of learning about the country one is about to occupy seemed obvious to Feldman. However, besides very different reasons to go to war with Germany and Japan – essentially repelling an aggression versus preventive strike in Iraq – the contexts and purpose of both reconstruction projects were not very different in essence. At the strategic level, the main US objective in rebuilding Japan and Germany was to turn these two countries into rich and capitalist economies to constitute a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. The reconstruction of Iraq is an example of regime change to establish a liberal capitalist system run by a government friendly to the US and ready to support American policy in the region; thus enhancing the security of US interests globally. Paul Bremer, at the head of the CPA in Iraq, was aware of the differences between the post-Second World War and contemporary occupation projects. Due to the length of the Second World War, American planners had the time to work on occupation policies for two to three years before the end of the war and consider all possible contingencies. In Iraq, the US planners had a few months but yet managed to produce a rather comprehensive plan with clear objectives, while failing to assess accurately the extent of the Iraqi state collapse and subsequent rise of violence. While there was a sound knowledge of German and Japanese political, economic and cultural aspects among the staff of the occupation authorities, that data was lacking for US occupiers of Iraq, as it had been shut down to US interests for most of Saddam’s rule. Finally, Japan and Germany fought total wars, with their populations entirely mobilised behind the war effort. After the defeat, Germany and Japan had little choice left but to accept the occupation and the reconstruction project defined by their victors. In Iraq, the US toppled a regime but did not defeat a country. As Bremer underlines: ‘The vast majority of Iraqis were delighted to have Saddam and his henchmen thrown out, but few were happy to find a foreign, non-Muslim army occupying their country’ (Bremer 2006: 37). In the light of these considerations, it is understandable that Feldman was puzzled by his colleagues’ choice of reading material. However, it is also understandable that one might want to get informed about successful reconstruction ventures, as Germany and Japan indeed turned out to be for the United States. The underlying question in the mind of these CPA officials was why was the reconstruction of Japan and Germany successful?
