ABSTRACT
The separation of powers doctrine does not insist that there should be three institutions of government each operating in isolation from each other. Indeed, such an arrangement would be unworkable, particularly under a constitution dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. Under such an arrangement, it is essential that there be a sufficient interplay between each institution of the state. For example, it is for the executive, for the most part, to propose legislation for Parliament’s approval. Once passed into law, Acts of Parliament are upheld by the judiciary. A complete separation of the three institutions could result in legal and constitutional deadlock. Rather than a pure separation of powers, the concept insists that the primary functions of the state should be allocated clearly and that there should be checks to ensure that no institution encroaches significantly upon the function of the other. If hypothetical constitutional arrangements within a state are considered, a range of possibilities exists:
(a) absolute power residing in one person or body exercising executive, legislative and judicial powers: no separation of powers;
(b) power being diffused between three separate bodies exercising separate functions with no overlaps in function or personnel: pure separation of powers; and
(c) powers and personnel being largely – but not totally – separated with checks and balances in the system to prevent abuse: mixed government and weak separation of powers.
