ABSTRACT
IN Japan at the Cross Roads I suggested that the war would prove a great opportunity for Japanese industry and commerce, and my forecast has been justified by events. The “Yellow Peril” as an economic menace was previous to 1914 practically confined to Eastern Asia. Since 1914 it has become a very present thought in regard to our Indian Empire, to Australia, South Africa, the whole of the Pacific, and even in South America. The submarine campaign had the result-of course only one amongst many-of drawing a line from Port Said to New York. This line, on leaving the Mediterranean, ran south of the Azores and then curved up to the American Atlantic coast. That line delimitated the area of Japanese commercial activity, and almost equally our own. Everywhere south of it was open to Japanese economic penetration. North of it Japanese shipowners refused to risk their vessels. Previous to the war, raw silk, habutæ, copper, coal and cotton fabrics and goods were the basis of the Japanese export trade. The principal imports were foodstuffs, cotton and other textile raw materials, iron, steamers and machinery. In 1913 China and the United States accounted for almost exactly 66 per cent. of Japanese exports. Of the imports 42 per cent. came from the British Empire, and 60 per cent. of this proportion from India and Great Britain. Of the rest China accounted for 15 per cent., the United States for 20 per cent. and Germany for 8 per cent. The total value of Japanese imports and exports in the two pre war years was:
A table on p. 176 shows the geographical distribution of exports and imports in the years immediately preceding the war.
