ABSTRACT
Real and virtual arsenals The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) defines a nuclear weapon state (NWS) as a state that had tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) had done so: the Treaty therefore recognizes them as NWS. All others should forego acquisition of nuclear arms. By the testing criterion, another three states have become de facto NWS: India (1998), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006). In addition, Israel is known to have a nuclear arsenal without any confirmed testing. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, but left the Treaty in 2003 as the only country to have done so. Israel, India and Pakistan never joined. All other UN member states are parties to the Treaty. Some non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) can build such weapons in a matter of weeks or a few months if they decide to do so. While the number of states possessing ready-made weapons has increased only slowly, there is concern that “virtual arsenals” may now be growing faster, nurtured and legitimized by the growing interest in nuclear power. The key to virtual capabilities is national fuel cycle facilities and fissile materials on stock. Iranian leaders have indicated that they may seek such a status, similar to that of Japan. However, while “creeping in” under the testing criterion may be legal under the NPT, it is not necessarily legitimate.1
