ABSTRACT
The gap between mind and matter has been filled in, partly by new
views of mind, but much more by the realization that physics tells us
nothing as to the intrinsic character of matter.
Outline of Philosophy (1927)
In Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) Russell advocated a fourdimensionalist theory of material continuants persisting in time. By 1918 he was prepared to argue for a much broader form of four-dimensionalism. Not only material continuants persisting in time are to be constituted by series of transient physical particulars, but minds (as “selves” persisting in time) are also to be so constituted. This expansive four-dimensionalism is the key to understanding Russell’s neutral monism. As we shall see, it makes it unique. Russell is endeavoring to transcend the traditional distinction between minds (as continuants) and matter (as continuants), constructing both out of orderings of the physical events that are their stages.
