ABSTRACT
The two principles of justice examined in the previous chapter contain the central normative prescriptions of the theory of justice as fairness. A just society-or, to use Rawls’ more technical expression, a ‘well-ordered society’—is one whose basic structure is effectively regulated by the two principles of justice, in the particular lexical order that has been explained. However, Rawls does not think that the set of ground rules that constitute the basic structure of society can satisfy the principles of justice in a purely mechanical way, merely in virtue of their having the right content. In particular, he does not think that the basic structure can satisfy the principles independently of the moral dispositions and commitments of citizens. Rather, the ideal of a well-ordered society implies (a) that the principles of justice are publicly known to regulate the basic structure, (b) that citizens endorse these principles as fair, and (c) that they are sufficiently motivated to behave in ways that support the maintenance of just social institutions. When these conditions are met, the principles of justice provide a shared point of view that citizens can use to adjudicate their competing claims.1
