ABSTRACT
Introduction A seemingly innocuous island grouping in the South China Sea (SCS) has become the object of a complicated and multifarious struggle; a struggle that intensified when the Chinese navy arrived in the Spratly Islands for the first time in March 1988. They engaged in a battle with the Vietnamese navy, sinking three Vietnamese boats and killing more than 70 Vietnamese sailors. In early 1995, to the consternation of the Philippines, China occupied Mischief Reef, part of the Spratlys, which is located within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone claimed by the Philippines, and constructed markers on the reef. These actions caused a strong sense of emergency among the littoral states of the SCS, and forcibly emphasised the threat emanating from China, which seemingly began to project its military might onto Southeast Asia. With few diplomatic avenues open between China and these states at that time, and aggravated by ambiguity and a suspicion on the motives and intention of China, the situation in the SCS was heading for an escalation in tension. The claimants felt a strong urge to scramble for what they considered to be rightfully theirs. Over 15 years since China forcefully established its formidable presence in the area, the Spratly Islands dispute has not yet been settled. However, China together with all the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, which, among other stipulations, required the disputants to exercise self-restraint in activities that would raise tension in the area. The declaration specified, ‘inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cay, and other features’ as among such provocative activities.1 China hereby unequivocally committed itself to good neighbourliness towards the ASEAN nations concerning the issue of the SCS. This indicates a great change in the nature of the dispute compared with the time when China’s aggressive and unilateral behaviours sent an alarm among regional states. It seems, at least for the time being, that the dragon has been tamed effectively in the SCS. Several questions can be asked on the disputes in the SCS. Why and how has such a change taken place? How do the claimants currently manage and prevent disputes in the area? What are the future prospects for peace and stability in the
area? With these questions in mind, this chapter seeks to identify the process and mechanisms by which China has transformed itself into a good neighbour of the ASEAN states in managing disputes in the SCS. The focus on China’s behaviour can be justified for several reasons. First, China’s ‘creeping assertiveness’ over the SCS is the largest concern among the claimants. With its sheer size and increasing economic, political and military power, China can seriously affect peace and stability in the SCS depending on how it acts. There is a fear that China may soon turn its rising economic power into military prowess, which it may use to back up its territorial claims in the SCS. It is therefore crucial for other claimants to prevent such prospects from being realised or, at least, to keep China from acting unilaterally in the area. Second, four of the six claimants, that is, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam are member states of ASEAN, which has developed a unique way of managing conflicts among its members with peaceful means.2 The first three states are long-time members of the organisation and have sufficiently internalised the ‘ASEAN Way’ of conflict management including its values and norms and the last one, a relatively young member, is rapidly socialising within the organisation. For this reason, it is relatively easy for these claimants to peacefully manage disputes that arise among themselves. Third, another claimant, Taiwan does not play a role comparable to that of China. Like Beijing, Taipei, as a government claiming to represent the Chinese nation, still maintains its traditional position that the SCS belongs to it. However, compared with the earlier period, Taiwan has recently kept an ambivalent attitude towards the SCS, perhaps reflecting an increasing awareness within Taiwanese society of its own identity vis-à-vis mainland China.3 For a long time it seemed that Taiwan no longer gave priority to the SCS issue and was thus unlikely to act aggressively to assert its territorial claim, though its interest in the region does appear to have risen. This chapter first provides the outline of the SCS disputes. The significance of the SCS and a short historical review of the dispute including its origin and early situation and the late involvement of China are discussed. Focusing on the Spratly Islands dispute, the chapter also looks at the structure of the dispute by identifying the inherent issues and the primary parties and other stakeholders. The chapter then examines the conflict management mechanisms and seeks to find how the Spratly Islands dispute is managed. Based on these considerations, the chapter finally discusses the prospects for the peaceful management of the disputes in the SCS.
