ABSTRACT
Few policy areas have witnessed such intense activity and rapid evolution in recent years as that of energy security. With its dependence on external oil and gas supplies rising inexorably, the European Union (EU) has set out its stall to become a lead player on energy questions. This applies to both the foreign policy dimensions of energy security and strategies to tackle climate change. However, in respect of the former, the EU has failed to implement a common vision, whereas in relation to climate change policy, it is fast surrendering its leadership credentials. In both areas, the commitment to forward-looking, cosmopolitan principles is increasingly qualified. In formal terms, the EU has staked out an approach to energy security that
is based heavily on liberal internationalist norms. Its stated cornerstones are interdependence, market integration within and beyond Europe, and a convergence of governance standards. Time and time again, EU documents and European ministers and policy-makers reject realist geopolitics as a basis for energy security. The EU also lays claim to a ‘rules-based governance’ approach to energy security. Integral to the liberal approach is the conviction that more open and accountable governance in producer states is a necessary part of Europe’s own energy security interests. In practice, however, energy security is an area in which geopolitical realism has made one of its most spectacular comebacks. In their foreign policy strategies, member state governments seek the influence that flows from European-wide market rules while simultaneously pursuing short-term gain from highly geopolitical behaviour. Rivers of ink are spent extolling the EU’s environmental leadership. Only the
most churlish could deny that the EU has indeed done much to focus debate on the challenge of climate change. It is even said that the EU approaches the international politics of environmental protection as one of its core constituent values, whereas the US sees the issue narrowly through the prism of bargained interests.1 Here, normative values and enlightened self-interest converge. Europe is not set to be as directly or drastically affected by climate change as many other regions. But water shortages will appear in southern Europe, and the future will bring an additional strain on food supplies, increased conflict over water, the spread of infectious diseases, more frequent and severe natural disasters and an increase in the number of environmental refugees. These are
all good reasons for far-reaching action now. And yet European states are increasingly squirming to escape the rigours of their own headline-grabbing targets to reduce carbon emissions, invest in renewable energy sources and assist developing countries improve their environmental records.
