ABSTRACT
The former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, United States Marine Corps (USMC), in his assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006, remarked that “[a]ny attempt to predict the future security environment of 2025 is inherently difficult . . . Given the dynamics of change over time, we must develop a mix of agile and flexible capabilities to mitigate uncertainty.”1 He also noted that the QDR acknowledges that “victory in this long war depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as [the] application of kinetic effects.”2 While General Pace’s immediate reference was to the war on terrorism, the sense of uncertainty and indeterminacy that permeates his assessment points to the growing recognition that “victory” is as transient as the other elements that constitute this emerging condition. When considered in the context of the rationally predictable security calculus of the now fading Cold War strategic paradigm, this recognition represents a distinct shift in how global militaries – particularly the US military and defense establishment – have begun to perceive the emerging strategic environment. The 2006 QDR describes this shift in the following terms:
• From a peacetime tempo – to a wartime sense of urgency • From a time of reasonable predictability – to an era of surprise and uncertainty • From single-focused threats – to complex challenges • From nation-state threats – to decentralized network threats • From conducting war against nations – to conducting war in countries we are
not at war with (safe havens) • From large institutional forces (tail) – to more powerful operational capabili-
ties (teeth).3
