ABSTRACT
The Clausewitzian theory of war has proven itself to be one of the most comprehensive theorizations of not simply the conduct of war, but also of the concept of war. As we have seen, despite its lineage – which can be traced back to the early and ultra-rationalistic theories of war and combat – the Clausewitzian architectonic was crafted to ensure that the theoretical framework within which we understand, relate to, and experience war, has remained robustly flexible to withstand the test of time. In this connection, it is also worth mentioning that the relevance of the Clausewitzian theory of war has not been diminished despite the advent of increasingly powerful weapon-platforms culminating with the production and deployment of the thermo-nuclear weapon. As the works of Brodie, Freedman, Luttwak, Wohlsletter, and Schelling, among that of others, show, even in martial scenarios involving the mutually assured destruction of the belligerents (and of others), the framework of analysis has always been cast in a Clausewitzian mode. This flexibility that was built into the Clausewitzian architectonic of war is indeed remarkable and is a testimony to the strategic success of the Clausewitizian project. The question, therefore, stands: What accounts for the call to re-evaluate the Clausewitzian theory of war in the Age of Information?
