ABSTRACT
Since the early 1980s, many governments in Western Europe have attempted to reform labor markets and welfare states through social pacts, nationallevel agreements with unions and sometimes employers. Other governments have opted for the unilateral route of legislation to reform, and yet others have resorted to both pacts and legislation. The emergence of social pacts is most commonly understood as a government response to severe economic problems whose precise form and content are shaped by industrial relations institutions. However, while economic problems may confront governments with the need to enact reforms, they fall short of explaining the incidence of social pacts as governments can also revert to legislation to implement policies. Whether, and when, governments choose one or the other is better explained by considering the political role of governments, in particular the interests of governing parties in the electoral arena. Thus, when governments (or governing parties) consider how to implement potentially unpopular labor and welfare reforms, their decision is heavily influenced by electoral considerations. Since approximately the 1980s, parties and governments in Western Europe have been facing growing electoral pressures because of the increasingly volatile and fluid electorate and the rise of new parties. Moreover, voters hold the government responsible for the state of economy. In addition, voters’ dissatisfaction with welfare state performance “is becoming increasingly salient in real-world politics” and “matters for political orientations and behaviour” Kumlin ( 2007a : 366). Controlling for other factors (class, ideology, and retrospective economic evaluations), dissatisfaction with welfare state performance has a “significant negative impact on the probability of voting for a government party” (Kumlin 2007a : 366). These factors combine to shape governments’ choices to privilege reforms either through social pacts or through legislative procedure. In subsequent sections we briefly summarize the main results of our analysis, reflect on the relationship between our quantitative and qualitative findings, consider the consequences for governing parties of pact offers and legislation, and set out some of the broader theoretical implications of our work.
