ABSTRACT
The generally held image of innovation is that of a heroic quest for a breakthrough that can disrupt or create an industry and solve society-wide problems. Somewhat ironically, the vast majority of technology projects are relatively incremental, and it is towards these that the decades of accumulated managerial routines, instruments, and scholarly thinking are geared. Even as there exists a considerable amount of literature on breakthrough projects, “few empirical studies have identifi ed the idiosyncrasies of the development process for radical and really new innovations” and there is “considerable anecdotal evidence that radical innovations require unique and sophisticated development strategies, but little empirical evidence to support these theories” (Garcia and Calantone 2002). Further, most innovation processes have been analyzed only when their outcomes and impact have been readily identifi able. Indeed, the fi rst thing people wish to know about potential innovation-laymen and investors alike-is “what does it do; what impact will it have?” But what do we really know about how far inventors can specify such outcomes-the value, details, usages, and implications of the product-in an early, ongoing, and potentially discontinuous innovation process? Some recent research has begun to duly recognize these uncertainties (e.g., Duret et al. 1999; Colarelli O’Connor 1998) and underline the management challenge that lies in clarifying what kind of innovativenessand, by the same token, deviance from existing solutions and markets-the innovation is likely to introduce, since decisions affecting innovativeness can have dramatic impacts on the ability to advance the project.
