ABSTRACT
The larger argument regarding literature’s function in the public sphere outlined in the preceding, introductory chapter needs to be preceded by an account of the literary form of aesthetic rationality. Therefore I turn first to a description and evaluation of Habermas’s account of aesthetic rationality. This chapter focuses on describing those aspects of Habermas’s theory of communicative action relevant to any theory of aesthetic rationality, and hence to any theory of literary rationality. Although remarking in passing on contentious issues, I will reserve the elaboration of my criticism for the following chapter. The theory of communicative action relies on a complex notion of human
reason that includes several forms of rationality. The arguments presented through the exercise of these distinct forms of rationality substantiate different kinds of validity claims with different kinds of support. In contrast to theoretical or practical arguments, for instance, which establish truth or correctness claims, aesthetic critique establishes the appropriateness of (culturally specific) value standards: “[Aesthetic criticism] is a variation of a form of argumentation in which the adequacy of value standards, the vocabulary of our evaluative language generally, is made thematic.”1
