ABSTRACT
In the Phaedo we get a number of remarks which seem either to contrast the objects of sense-observation with Forms, or to contrast the possibilities of enquiry with the aid of the senses with that pursued by reason alone. These contrasts are not distinguished in the dialogue. Thus at 65d we are told that there are such things as Just itself and Good, but that no one has ever perceived any of them with any of the senses. They are best studied by the intellect, and by it alone, without ‘help’ of the senses. But this is part of a passage where it is also said that the senses ‘contain no truth’, which is the preserve of reason. The objects that cannot be seen are objects of reason, and the objects of sense-observation do not yield truth and are not proper subjects of reason’s interest. Now it is not obvious why these contrasts should go together, nor quite what they are. Thus, it might seem that I cannot see Just itself in that the definition of ‘just’ is not a visible object, but then, why cannot I discover the truth about empirical facts, or at least use reason on them? Of course, seeing is not reasoning, nor are men what it is to be a man, but there is no obvious reason for pairing off the first members of each pair and second members of each pair. One explanation could be, of course, that Plato is thinking of reason as a form of non-sensory perception which therefore must have exclusive possession of certain objects. In that case he might naturally suppose that it must have a non-sensory object, and then, having found some non-sensory objects that are the subject of definition and argument, he would accept the pairing without more ado. Before just accepting this, however, it would be necessary to go through the various Phaedo passages in order.
