ABSTRACT
In order to deal with the problem posed at the end of the last chapter it will be necessary to examine the way Plato talks of reason, and especially the tie between reason and goodness. Since the final goal of reason is knowledge (episteme) an examination of what Plato says on this topic will also be necessary. In all this it is important not to be cumbered by too many prejudices derived from the English terms or from post-Platonic philosophical interests. Thus it is very tempting to take the tripartite division of the person in Republic Book IV as an embryonic distinction of faculties. Men have the capacity to reason-a capacity used in learning-they can desire and they have an element resistant to desire. It is, of course, a crude first stumble. ‘Desire’ is limited to desire for certain objects, and the middle element is an attempt either to isolate that varied area of emotional reaction which can be contrasted with appetite or to isolate the will, our capacity to enforce our decisions as to what is best on our recalcitrant lusts. Still, it is a first attempt at an analysis of mental capacities carried out more systematically by later philosophers.
