ABSTRACT
In chapter I, I began trying to expound the form of Plato’s defences against a position that threatened to erode traditional morality. It is now time to review the situation and see in what sense a defence has been offered. For this it is worth recalling that in Republic Book I (348), Thrasymachus’ challenge is taken as having three prongs. ‘Injustice’ is preferable to ‘justice’ because it is more intelligent, because it gives one power to do as one wants and because it is generally good, while ‘justice’ is stupidity, an abandonment of the power to do as one wants and bad. Each of these points is countered, and they are treated as interconnected, ‘The power to do as one wants’ is interpreted as ‘the power to do/get what satisfies one’s desires’. It is argued that this is a complex matter, and it emerges as clearly requiring intelligence. If being ‘unjust’ is a good state to be in, then it will constitute the correct functioning of the psyche and so of the ordering, intellectual functions. If we study the requirements of episteme we realise that on Thrasymachus’ sort of view there is no possibility of constructing an episteme that can be held to cover what is good for man. At best one could become adept at ensuring the satisfaction of the dominant desire of the moment, but that is a far cry from being epistemon about human life.
