ABSTRACT
Bacon, who is usually held to be the originator of the modern theory of induction and whom Popper uses as its characteristic representative, is taken by Popper as advocating that scientists base their theories on the presuppositionless observation of repetitions in order to attain the truth about the world. Bacon thought that the observation of repetitions was not psychologically primary in Hume’s sense because observation was often interfered with by mental anticipations and prejudice, but that the good scientist attempted to empty his mind of any prior beliefs or expectations in order that he might be led to unprejudiced observation and hence to correct theories. In this chapter I shall examine Popper’s argument against the idea that the observation of repetitions is or should be primary in the arousal of theories, while I shall leave examination of Popper’s rejection of the logical primacy of repetitions (and his claim that inductivists are straightforwardly committed to it) to the following chapter.
