ABSTRACT
We have now examined Peirce’s theories of truth and representation and surveyed the products of the ‘pre-logical’ sciences. We have considered his views about the logic of acritical perceptual judgments and his account of a priori necessary reasoning. It is now time to raise the fundamental question: what leading principles, what methods and patterns of inference, should make up the logica utens of the earnest seeker after truth? We have to justify forms of ampliative reasoning by showing that their adoption would answer to the needs of someone who has adopted the single-minded pursuit of truth as his overriding aim. Thus, if he is to carry out his project successfully, Peirce must provide a description of the methods and arguments used in scientific research and demonstrate their validity, derive their adequacy from ‘the presumption from which science starts out’. Peirce was confident that he did have a justification of induction and the other components of the scientific method, and believed that, sooner or later, everyone would have to endorse his view (NE iii 211). He discussed these topics on many occasions, and there is considerable consistency in the things he says at different times. I shall concentrate here upon elaborating the main themes in his mature position, and shall not say much about the respects in which his views did develop.1
