ABSTRACT
If Spinoza held the reported view, however, he soon came to change his mind. In the Short Treatise (II, 23), he argues that the soul may be so united with God as to come to share in His immutability, and to be immortal. The form of immortality which he describes has several notable features (Taylor (2), pp. 146-7). First, it seems to be a type of existence which may be entered into during the present life, not something for which we must wait until death. Second, it is not, as in Christian belief, something inherent in all men, but is to be acquired by each; and those who succeed in acquiring it may possess it in different degrees. Finally, it can be obtained by regulating our thoughts, and by forming adequate ideas. As we shall see, these conceptions survive even in the Ethics, albeit with significant changes. The most obvious differences between Spinoza’s first and last discussions are twofold: the Ethics speaks of minds, not of souls, and it holds out the hope, not of immortality, but of eternity. Yet the underlying consistency of Spinoza’s approach is remarkable. At no time does he seem to have been drawn to the Platonic and Cartesian view that the soul or mind is a substance, capable of existing independently of the body (cf. VI, 1); still less he was attracted to the Christian dogma of survival in a resurrected body (Harris, pp. 670-1; Hampshire (2), pp. 171-2).
