ABSTRACT
When The Round Table first set out to pose the dilemma of Empire – the question how liberty and self-government in the Dominions could be reconciled with their involvement in the foreign and defence policy of the mother country, in formulating which they had no voice – its founders insisted at every turn that a solution should not, and probably could not, be imposed from the centre. It should come by the initiative of the oversea [sic] dominions themselves, shouldering their share of the burden of imperial defence, and claiming their right to participate in its control. The particular solution most discussed in the early days of the review was
that of federation or organic union, on similar principles to those embodied in the Constitution of the United States of America. Any hope of winning general consent to such a degree of centralization foundered, as we can now retrospectively see, in the First World War. The Dominions, led by Canada, their sovereignty internationally recognized when they signed the peace treaties as high contracting parties, set their faces for many years against the creation of any central institutions of government; for every such proposal was suspected to conceal an insidious hankering of Whitehall after the reintroduction of United Kingdom control. Now that after half a century the Prime Ministers meeting in London have at last consented to set up a Commonwealth
Secretariat, it must be regarded, not as an approach to federation, but as the first Con-federal institution. But the early argument of The Round Table is to this extent vindicated, that the new body has been projected on the initiative of the oversea members themselves. Even Canada has ceased to be suspicious; and the many younger members emancipated in recent years show their confidence and political maturity by being quite free of the fear that, by asking for a common organ of co-operation, they are in any way jeopardizing their new independence. Although the location of the new secretariat in London is a practical
necessity, for the Commonwealth must have a centre, it is important to maintain in its working the same impulse from oversea to which its foundation responded. [ … ] The secretariat is to be conceived as a joint organ of the oversea members of the Commonwealth, linking them to one another as well as to the United Kingdom; and it is placed in London solely because that is at present the most convenient node of Commonwealth communications. [ … ] The mode of its recruitment has yet to be defined. There is no visible gov-
erning body short of the Prime Ministers’ Conference itself. It is reasonable to suppose that, through the current channels of consultation while the Conference is not in session, some committee of officials will be set up charged with general supervision and with selecting at least a Secretary General and his Deputy. After that it would be desirable to allow these heads of the organization the principal voice in choosing their subordinates. The secretariat is hardly likely to offer its staff a career for life, nor is it desirable that it should, for then there would be a danger of their becoming in effect immigrant denizens of the United Kingdom and losing their capacity to represent the Commonwealth. It would be more natural for them to be enlisted for a term of years by secondment from the civil or diplomatic services of their respective countries. They will need to be drawn from all its widely separated regions; but it would be a mistake to insist on a mathematical distribution. Every state of the Commonwealth should, over the years, contribute some of its subjects to the staff; but it is not necessary that each and all should be represented at any one time. It is far more important that the Secretary General should be free to select and lead a small team, whose personal distinction will command the confidence of the authorities with whom he has to deal. [ … ] The great function and value of the secretariat is to provide, what has often
been found defective, lines of communication running, so to speak, round the rim of the Commonwealth wheel, rather than along the spokes leading to and from the centre. This function is quite distinct from any hitherto discharged by the Commonwealth Relations Office [CRO], although there are also some aspects of the work of that office that it will be natural for the secretariat to take over. It needs, incidentally, to be kept constantly in mind that the operative words are ‘take over’, not ‘duplicate’. [ … ] One function that must certainly be taken over by the secretariat is the
organization of the Prime Ministers’ meetings themselves. This was for long the business of the British Cabinet Office, which at one time tended to exclude
the CRO, though not so much in 1964 as on some previous occasions. Whether through the one office or the other, Great Britain has borne the responsibility too long, and its transfer to the collective shoulders of the Commonwealth should be warmly welcomed. Even the attempt to keep British control of the agenda for the meetings is a temptation to be resisted. There have been three main lines of criticism of the project in the United
Kingdom. To some it seems a manifestation of ingratitude for the services of the mother country to the Commonwealth in the years of tutelage. Undoubtedly at the last meeting there were signs of resentment by the visiting Prime Ministers at what they thought was their British colleagues’ desire to score political points – perhaps reflecting dissatisfaction with their relationship to the CRO. But this, if it existed, was an ephemeral sentiment: the lasting reality is the sense of maturity among the junior members. There is nothing ungrateful or unfilial in the wish to be recognized as adult. Secondly, there is the fear that the new organization will grow without
limit; and that undoubtedly is a danger to be closely watched – perhaps most vigilantly by the score of Commonwealth Treasuries. And thirdly, there is the fear that the secretariat will become a begging agency. As to that, the days of central support and, in one form or another, subsidies to the less prosperous Commonwealth peoples are certainly not over. Having pride in our imperial tradition we should be glad to be munificent, and must rely on the Commonwealth secretariat to keep us informed of what our more needy fellow-subjects want. Finally, the secretariat should be ready to fortify the Commonwealth at one
of its points of potential weakness – the difficulty of securing combined action in time of urgent emergency. It is not only between Washington and Moscow that a ‘hot line’ is necessary. In this special department, unlike diplomacy, relations for the Commonwealth are not bilateral. They are multilateral by nature, and an organization is required for quickly securing multilateral decisions when danger threatens. This could be the most vital, though the least frequent, of the many services to be expected of the Commonwealth Secretariat.
