ABSTRACT
Conspiracy theories matter, and conspiracist theorists matter equally so, in understanding the political language and the political dynamics of the Arab world. Conspiracy theories are not a phenomenon unique to the region: popular
conspiracism is a feature of US society, with proponents deriving a conspiracist worldview from a variety of sources, and with much of the US public as keen on conspiracy theories for entertainment as for other reasons. Conspiracism was a feature of the language of the leadership of the Soviet Union. A genuine sense of conspiracy has, in the past, pervaded the Chinese government’s sense of China’s place in the world and the threats it faces from abroad. Whether Arab conspiracy theories are being advocated by the state, or by societal units and individuals, or by transnational actors, the most important fact is that they are a common, widespread feature of the region, but not just of the region alone. There is, of course, no objective way to measure the precise degree to which certain societies or polities – including those of the Arab world – are conspiracist. Notwithstanding this, it is difficult to challenge seriously the assertion that conspiracism occurs in the Arab world, and in addition, that it occurs on a regular and wide basis, that it is sustained by a variety of political actors and forces, and that it has political impacts that complement its political sources. All that reasonably can be challenged are the reasons for such a preponderance of conspiracism in the Arab world. That has been the goal here, with a view to an understudied aspect of Arab Middle Eastern politics that has been and remains important.
