Introduction

Since 2000 Russia’s defence budget has risen tenfold. Russia has applied its ‘energy weapon’ against former Soviet republics that followed a pro-Western course. Under President Vladimir Putin’s Russia unfolded an anti-Western stance, condemning NATO expansion, unilateral and dominating policies, the deployment of a missile shield and the ‘Cold War vestiges’ of the current European security architecture. Subsequently, in December 2007 Moscow suspended the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which by both sides had always been considered as the cornerstone of post Cold War European security. This assertive stance has been combined with sabre-rattling. The Kremlin has shown its military power by threatening to aim nuclear missiles at European states, by conducting military drills with China, by resuming strategic nuclear bomber flights, by conducting naval exercises in the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean, by recommencing the traditional military parade on Red Square, as well as by dispatching strategic bombers and warships to Latin America for carrying out joint war games in Washington’s backyard. In August 2008 the assertive posture of the resurgent Russia escalated under President Dmitry Medvedev, when Russian armed forces invaded and occupied large parts of Georgia, after its attack on the secessionist region of South Ossetia. This enumeration of events gives the impression that Russia is back as a superpower, capable of projecting power. This book provides an analysis of Russia’s international security policy since Vladimir Putin was sworn in as President of the Russian Federation in 2000. The work is a mixture of theory and practice, policy structure by research of security documents and policy statements, and policy implementation by analysing Russia’s performance, e.g. in bi-and multilateral cooperation and Moscow’s actions in regions and against specific states. This introduction proceeds with the basics of Russia’s security views, by comparing Moscow’s current policy with traditional principles of security thinking. Next, to set the scene, details are given of the maturing of Russian security policy and the ensuing structure of key documents under Yeltsin’s presidency in the 1990s, as the foundation of the subsequent policy eras of Putin and Medvedev. The introduction continues with an explanation of the research set-up and finishes with an overview of major developments in Russia and in the world, related to Moscow’s external security policy (1991-2009).