ABSTRACT
In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 defeat, Nasser’s top priorities were internal security and maintaining control of his presidency. Given his doubts about the loyalty of his internal security apparatus and the army, the ra’is gave Salah Nasr’s EGIS unprecedented new powers on the domestic front. Salah Nasr was also instructed to open a secret channel to Washington in order to gauge American views on the Nasser regime, war termination and future EgyptianSoviet relations. At the same time, Nasser took advantage of the defeat to finally turn on his old colleague and rival, Marshal ‘Amr. The grim political and economic realities of the 1967 defeat forced Egypt to reexamine its national security strategy as well. Consequently, new emphasis was placed on accommodation with the conservative Arab powers like Saudi Arabia and exploiting the Palestinian resistance as leverage over Israel. Cairo also turned to Moscow for new weapons and advice in restructuring its military and internal security apparatus. Finally, Nasser initiated a ‘War of Attrition’ on the Suez Canal front to try and raise international pressure on Israel to cease its Sinai occupation. The 1967 defeat also triggered reforms in the Egyptian intelligence community. First, Israel was finally given the priority it deserved in the areas of collection and analysis. Second, the Egyptians reorganized their technical intelligence effort and acquired new surveillance capabilities from the Soviet Union. Together these changes were instrumental to early Egyptian success in the 1973 war. Unfortunately for Egyptian society, Nasser’s post-war promises to dismantle what he called the ‘Intelligence State’ were not kept. When Nasser died in September 1970 the mukhabarat state proved to be as strong and resilient as ever. Even so, the 1967 humiliation and the failure of Arab Socialism had released new Islamist forces within Egypt that were to impact heavily on domestic security in coming decades.
