ABSTRACT
T HIS chapter represents an attempt to clarify JOrgen Haber-mas's concepts of communicative rationality and the emancipa-tory interest in only one aspect-namely, how the opposites, irrationality and oppression, are to be explained. It seems to me that the question of the explanation of nonemancipation arises at all levels of Habermas's inquiry. He chooses to argue throughout the postinaugural work that important facets of rationality have been suppressed and must be recaptured. I will try to show that Habermas short-circuits his own demonstration and, despite his declared intentions, too easily moves from the level of formal reconstructions to content-laden claims. In so doing, he is unable to provide a satisfactory account of why emancipation is impeded once an orthodox materialist option is abandoned. Finally, I would like to propose that Habermas may be able to meet this demand through the introduction of theological concepts of "sin" and "guilt."
