CICERO, ‘THE PEOPLE’S CONSUL’, 63

When Cicero delivered De Lege Agraria he made it clear that he wished not only to be ‘the people’s consul’ but also to ensure ‘peace abroad, freedom, the proudest right of every Roman, stability at home and all else that is so precious and so dear to the hearts of every one of you’ (10). He assured his audience they had elected ‘a man of vigilance, courage, perseverance and devotion’ (100); the dramatic events of 63 gave him every opportunity to demonstrate those qualities. Cicero took office on 1 January with Antonius Hybrida, Catiline’s run-

ning mate, as his consular colleague. There were rumours ‘that Antonius knew about the conspiracy of Catiline and was not averse to it, owing to the magnitude of his debts’ (Plutarch, Cicero 12), but any such inclinations were immediately headed off by Cicero, who had been assigned the lucrative Macedonia as his proconsular province. He offered it to his colleague, and ‘by this favour he induced Antonius, like a hired actor, to play the second rôle to him in defence of their country’ (ibid.). Antonius severed his relationship with Catiline, swapped a risk for a certainty, and took a back seat for the year. At the beginning of the year Cicero was involved in a variety of issues,

the first of which was an unusual legal case. Labienus, a tribune with close links to Caesar, prosecuted an elderly senator, Rabirius, for treason. His specific crime was to have been part of the group that had murdered the fiery tribune Saturninus in 100 when an SCU was in force. The legal procedure being used was archaic, perduellio, for which the punishment was crucifixion. Caesar was one of the judges and Rabirius was found guilty. Both Hortensius and Cicero spoke on his behalf on appeal and the whole bizarre episode was halted when another archaic procedure of lowering a flag on the Janiculan Hill was invoked and business was ended. The populares had become increasingly concerned about the use of the SCU, the Senate’s ultimate decree, invoked in emergencies. In episodes such as the

death of Saturninus its scope had been sufficient not only to override the right of a Roman citizen to a trial but also to protect those responsible for his death. Rabirius’ trial must be seen as a warning shot from the populares that they were no longer prepared to accept the unlimited scope of an SCU. The proposed Rullan Bill was still under consideration and Antonius

hoped to become one of the ten commissioners. Plutarch (ibid.) records that Cicero took a strong line and ‘induced the tribunes to desist from the rest of their measures, so overpowered were they by his eloquence’. Public assets would have been privatised to distribute the land involved, and Cicero raised the potential military threat to the Republic of so many soldiers in Italy. He also suggested the Bill was not completely transparent, and that many would benefit unfairly from its provisions. Plutarch also mentions pressure at this time from the sons of the proscribed, who were demanding full restoration of their rights, but comments that, given the Catilinarian undercurrents, they were ‘disturbing the government at an improper and unseasonable time’ and their demands got nowhere. It had been customary for the equites to sit among the ordinary people of Rome in the theatre, but a law passed by Otho when he was tribune in 67 had demarcated an area of reserved seats. ‘The people took this as a mark of dishonour to themselves.’ At a performance attended by Otho they had shown their anger, and ‘disorder reigned in the theatre’ (Cicero 13). Cicero summoned everyone involved to the Temple of Bellona, where he publicly dressed them down and ordered them to return to the theatre and behave. Their immediate obedience shows the respect in which the new consul was held. The greatest threat to stability in 63 was the severe economic dislocation

which affected Rome but was particularly acute in the countryside of Italy. The Social War, the civil war between the Marians and Sullans and the revolts of Lepidus and Spartacus had all devastated rural communities in Italy. Farms had been trampled over, produce requisitioned and the situation complicated further by the displacement of peasants in areas such as Etruria, Cisalpine Gaul, Umbria, Campania, Apulia and Bruttium. Etrurian peasants had suffered particularly because so many had lost their land to make way for the returning Sullan veterans. Life had always been tough for Italian farmers, and these were the areas from which the Roman army had traditionally drawn the majority of its recruits. Some peasants had drifted to Rome, others had become labourers on their own land for new masters, while others had borrowed to re-establish their farms, only to find that a bad harvest could devastate them again and require additional borrowing. Depletion of the soil and the widespread use of slave labour also contributed to their problems and made smaller farms increasingly uncompetitive. As the prescribed penalty for reneging on debts was slavery, many were now desperate. After fifteen years as farmers many of Sulla’s veterans also had severe economic problems. Military ability was no guarantee of

agricultural success, particularly on poor-quality land, and many had failed to make a living; both Sallust (28) and Cicero (In Cat. 2.20) refer to them as key supporters of Catiline. Sallust (33) records a letter, allegedly from Manlius, a Sullan centurion and the leader of Catiline’s army in Etruria, which he hoped would be read to the Senate. It emphasises the economic plight of those who had taken up arms in Etruria, who were ‘poor needy wretches; the cruel harshness of moneylenders has robbed most of us of our homes and all have lost reputation and fortune’. Manlius laments the failure of the Senate to act but insists that their objective is ‘freedom’ and certainly not ‘dominion and riches’. The war against Mithridates was close to its conclusion, and the hope of

great financial benefits lay within reach, but it had dislocated trade, considerably reduced taxation income to Rome and created a cash-flow crisis. Lenders had started to call in their debts as the prospect of lucrative investments in the new Eastern provinces presented themselves. Credit was in very short supply and interest rates had become prohibitive. It was not just a problem for the poorest members of society; the issue of debt stretched from top to bottom. The rich found themselves financially embarrassed thanks to their excessive spending, but also because of the increasing costs involved in pursuing a political career in Rome. The provision of lavish hospitality and financial inducements during elections had become the norm, and many leading families had become land-rich but cash-poor, living on credit but reluctant to sell property, as it could bring them below the property qualification level required for membership of the Senate. Even if they had wanted to sell, the property market was depressed and there were few buyers in the market. Others had merely squandered their wealth and had accumulated large debts. There was a high level of unemployment within Rome, exacerbated by a slowdown in spending, and problems arising from wealth inequality caused resentment and discontent in the city. Most of the plebs existed from casual job to casual job, paying high rents for overcrowded, poorly built accommodation, and the job market had become even more competitive because of the influx of labourers from the countryside. The appalling state of the economy, the scale of wealth inequality and

perilously precipitous levels of debt were not matters the Senate felt obliged to tackle. Unusually the tribunes of 63 were united in their desire to introduce some reform to ease the economic problems, of which the Rullan Bill was merely one element. Cicero believed reform would destabilise the state, as he considered poverty to be the problem of the individual and looked to the traditional methods of patronage and paternalism, the rich caring for the poor, as the best solution. Limited land distribution and the use of grain doles to alleviate immediate suffering were as far as Cicero was prepared to go in acknowledging any state responsibility for the problems. But there was a crisis looming, and Plutarch wrote, ‘All Etruria was roused to

revolt, as well as most of Cisalpine Gaul. And Rome was most dangerously disposed towards change on account of the irregularity in the distribution of wealth … and it was in the power of any bold man to overthrow the commonwealth, which was in a diseased condition’ (Cicero 10). The ‘bold man’ of 63 was Catiline, who had gathered around him a group

of disreputable senators even before the 64 elections. They were described by Sallust (16) as ‘the neediest and most reckless of his acquaintance’, the most important of which was Lentulus Sura, who had been consul in 71 but was expelled from the Senate in 70. By 64 he was fully rehabilitated, re-entered the Senate, and became praetor in 63. Cassius Longinus, who had been Cicero’s fellow praetor in 66, was another supporter; Cicero called him the barrel of lard, because of his enormous size. Gaius Cornelius Cethegus, described as ‘wild and forceful,’ by Sallust (23), and Quintus Curius, who had been expelled from the Senate in 70 for scandalous living and was ‘deeply sunk in crime and debauchery’ (17), also backed Catiline. Sallust (17) mysteriously refers to ‘a number of men of high standing who took a more secret part in the movement’, which could suggest the possible involvement of Caesar and Crassus, the latter because he ‘would have been glad to see Pompey’s supremacy threatened by the rise of another powerful man’ (17-18). Other supporters mentioned by name are Statilius, who was one of the equites, and Caeparius from Tarracina, a Roman colony. Sallust (23) gives details of a meeting held before the 64 election when as oath was sealed by the drinking of ‘bowls of human blood mixed with wine’. Even Sallust accepted that this may well have been an invented story and needed ‘better proof than is forthcoming’ to substantiate it. Sallust does not report the story recorded by both Dio (37.30) and Plutarch (Cicero 10) in which ‘he [Catiline] sacrificed a boy and, after administering the oath over his entrails, ate them in company with others’. Catiline’s plan was to take over Rome and divide the spoils among the conspirators. According to Sallust (23), his ‘frenzy showed no signs of abating’ and ‘every day he enlarged his plans’; arms were sent to key points within Italy and an army was planned, to be stationed and recruited in Etruria and led by Manlius. Cicero had penetrated the inner workings of this plot at some point

before the 64 elections. Curius had a mistress, Fulvia. He was very short of money and ‘sunk over head and ears in infamy and crime’ but he ‘suddenly began to talk big and offer her the earth’ (Sallust 23). When Fulvia discovered what was going on ‘she decided that such a serious danger to the state must not be concealed’ and took her story to Cicero and to other influential senators. They were ‘seething with jealousy’ at Cicero’s possible election, seeing it as ‘a defilement of the consulship for an outsider, however outstanding his merits, to be elected to it’, but, according to Sallust (23), they now accepted that, in such an emergency ‘jealousy and pride had to take a back seat’. Cicero then approached Curius, who was ‘induced to betray Catiline’s designs’ (26), and this infiltration into the very

heart of the conspiracy enabled Cicero to keep one step ahead of the plotters during his consulship and gave him a tremendous advantage. Catiline prepared to stand as consul again in 63 and the conspirators

planned to assassinate Cicero and other leading political figures during the election. Catiline was fighting on a platform of tabulae novae, cancellation of debts, and confidently expected to win. He had support from many sections of Roman society and the appeal of a politician who would remove the single biggest economic burden of the day must not be underestimated. According to Plutarch (Cicero 12), ‘the schemes of Catiline were still to remain concealed from the multitude’, and Cicero realised he could not move against him without some proof. Cicero had information, ‘but not sufficient for the conviction of a man of reputation and great power like Catiline’ (Cicero 14). Amid unfavourable omens, Cicero cancelled the election when he learned there would be an attempt on his life, and summoned Catiline to the Senate to question him about his intentions. Catiline arrogantly replied, ‘What dreadful thing am I doing if, when there are two bodies, one lean and wasted but with a head and the other headless but strong and large, I myself become a head for this?’ (ibid.). This veiled threat must have caused alarm, and Cicero’s own conduct of the election, surrounded by a virtual bodyguard of nobles and obviously wearing a breastplate underneath his toga, ‘thus showing them his peril’, led to Catiline’s second electoral defeat. Common sense had prevailed and ‘the people were incensed and rallied about him [Cicero]’ (ibid.). On 21 October Crassus came to Cicero with anonymous letters add-

ressed to several leading Roman senators but which had been delivered to him. They proved that Catiline was in the process of organising an armed coup in Rome and advised the recipients to leave Rome quietly and quickly. They also gave advance warning of a military rising in Etruria led by Manlius. Plutarch (Cicero 15) believed Crassus had brought this information ‘seeking to free himself from charges that had been made against him on account of his friendship for Catiline’ but it seems unlikely that either Crassus or Caesar would have supported Catiline in 63. His plan for the cancellation of debts would surely have hit Crassus hard, as he was one of the most important moneylenders in Rome. Caesar, now praetor-elect and pontifex maximus, was well on his way to greatness and had nothing to gain from such a risky scheme. Logic would suggest that both men had severed links with Catiline but maybe loyalty to his old patron had induced Catiline to warn Crassus of his intentions. It is equally likely, however, that Crassus, as well as Cicero, was aware of the inner workings of the conspiracy and forged these letters to set procedures in train that would deal with Catiline for good; his former protégé was possibly proving too difficult to handle any other way. Many senators were still reluctant to believe that a fellow member, born

into a noble family, could be contemplating any action harmful to the

Republic, but Cicero now had something tangible to present. Cicero summoned the Senate at dawn the following day, 22 October, and the letters were read aloud by their addressees; each one indicated clearly that a plot was afoot. The Senate was also informed of troop movements in Etruria. Cicero asked for the SCU to be passed which, in Sallust’s words (29), gave the consuls ‘the most extensive powers that Roman custom allows it to entrust to magistrates. This decree authorises them to levy troops and conduct war, to apply unlimited force to allies and citizens alike, and to exercise supreme command and jurisdiction both at home and abroad’. With this authority granted, Cicero set to work immediately, sending four armies to potential trouble spots, Fiesole, Apulia, Capua and Picenum. The gladiatorial schools were disbanded, there was to be no repeat of Spartacus’ revolt in this volatile situation, and rewards, such as freedom for slaves, were offered for information. Night watches were posted in Rome; possibly at this point there was a skirmish in Etruria, but it came to nothing. Cicero had been unable to prove a link between Catiline and Manlius but

suspicions abounded, so Catiline voluntarily placed himself into the hands of the praetor, Caecilius Metellus Celer, although he does appear to have slipped away and held a secret meeting with his most important supporters at the house of Marcus Laeca in the street of the Scythe-makers. Cicero used the information from this meeting, gleaned from either Fulvia or Curius, in his First Catilinarian Speech, delivered to the Senate on 7 November. Cicero had summoned the senators to meet at the Temple of ‘Jupiter the Stayer’. The Senate could meet only on consecrated ground (the Senate House itself had that status), and they often met in temples. This temple had been promised by Romulus to Jupiter in exchange for rallying his troops in battle and giving them courage to stand and fight. The message Cicero was sending about the gravity of a situation was clear, although, on a practical level, it was an easier building to protect than the Senate House. Catiline attended the Senate, ‘either as part of his plan of dissimulation, or with the idea of establishing his innocence if any speaker should denounce him’ according to Sallust (31). The challenge from Cicero was clear and direct. He reported the details of the meeting, menacingly warning Catiline, ‘No single thing you do, nothing you attempt or even contemplate escapes my notice. I hear and see and plainly understand your every move’ (In Cat. 1.4). The evidence was compelling. Cicero explained that Rome had been divided into sections and that there would be an armed rising involving that most terrifying of weapons in the largely wooden city, fire. Cicero reported on the plans for his own assassination and that of other leading senators and rebuked those in the Senate who had, so far, been much more inclined to believe the disreputable senator with the acceptable pedigree than the novus homo from Arpinum: ‘Their mildness had fostered Catilina’s hopes and their refusal to believe in his growing conspiracy has given it strength’

(In Cat. 1.12). Their behaviour now, however, was sending out a very different message. Cicero commented (In Cat. 1.6) on the physical isolation of Catiline, sitting amid an ‘entire area of seats unoccupied and empty’, and Plutarch confirms that, ‘no senator would sit with him, but all moved away from the bench where he was’ (Cicero 16). The tide had now turned for Catiline. The overwhelming invective of

Cicero’s detailed speech demolished what remained of Catiline’s reputation and Cicero challenged him to ‘get off to your wicked and traitorous war’ (In Cat. 1.13). According to Sallust (32), Catiline, ever the master of dissimulation, pleaded his innocence, ‘with downcast eyes … and suppliant tones’. He reminded them of his patrician background, his ‘highest hopes’, cherished since childhood, of serving the Roman people, and then he insulted Cicero as ‘a mere immigrant’. The senators’ reaction to this can be inferred, as Catiline then lost his temper, storming off and hurling insults at the Senate itself and threatening them with ‘pulling everything down about your ears’ (32). The confrontation in the Senate on 7 November was a turning point in

the conspiracy. Catiline’s guilt was clear, the role of Cicero in uncovering his plans was now appreciated, and Catiline left Rome to join Manlius in Etruria. He deputed Lentulus to organise the conspiracy in the city with clear instructions ‘to do everything possible to increase the strength of the party, to find an early opportunity of assassinating Cicero, and to make arrangements for massacre, fire-raising and other violent outrages’ (33). Before he left Rome and was declared a public enemy, hostis, by the Senate, Sallust (36) records a letter from Catiline to Catulus, which was read to the Senate, in which he defended his actions, possibly hoping to recover the goodwill he had lost. Catiline claimed that he was the victim of ‘unjust suspicions’ and insisted that his business was merely ‘the championship of the oppressed’. The language of the letter is not Sallustian, which has led to suggestions that these may have been Catiline’s own words, or extremely close to them, but, whether dissimulation or justification, his protests no longer carried weight with his fellow senators. The economic distress in Rome was acute and many of the plebs urbana

were very attracted to Catiline’s plans. Sallust (36) records that ‘the city populace was especially eager to fling themselves into a revolutionary adventure’ but gives no explanation of why their support failed to materialise. Cicero would have argued that this was largely due to his Second Catilinarian Speech, delivered to the people in the Forum on 8 November but omitted by both Sallust and Plutarch in their accounts. The speech is a persuasive tour de force in which Cicero divulged the details of the plot and examined its nature. In the most famous section (In Cat. 2. 18-23), he identified six key groups of Catiline’s supporters, each more unpopular than the last, and rallied the people and the gods against such men. The first group he identified were the rich, always unpopular among the plebs,

whose ‘ambitions and intentions are scandalous’. The second group were debtors who wished to ‘seize control of the state’ through insurrection; Cicero’s claim that this would be done ‘amid the ashes of the city and the blood of its citizens’ would undoubtedly have struck fear into his audience. The Sullan veterans received special mention as the third group, their crimes compounded because they had ‘tainted some of the peasants’. The fourth group were ‘a motley and seditious crew’, life’s losers, the fifth were the criminal element and the sixth were identified as ‘Catilina’s special treasure, his picked elite, formed from his own beloved cronies and bosom friends’. Catiline’s appeal to the younger noblemen, his sporting of a widely copied chinstrap beard, and the wearing of togas so fine they appeared seethrough, had all contributed to allegations that he exerted unnatural power over young men. Cicero’s speech is bombastic but also subtly persuasive, as he cleverly identified the plotters with the most unpopular groups in society and played upon the fears and prejudices of his listeners. As there was no rising within Rome itself, and the discontented plebs failed to back Catiline, it must be assumed that Cicero’s eloquence left the conspirators poorly supported in the city and was an important factor in controlling a potentially explosive situation. Plutarch (Cicero 18) records in detail the activities of Lentulus, who had

been instructed to increase support for the conspiracy. There was certainly nothing ‘trifling or insignificant’ about his plans, as he had decided ‘to kill all the senators and as many of the other citizens as they could, to burn down the city itself, and to spare no one except the children of Pompey’. The night of the Saturnalia, a feast held in December to celebrate the dedication of the Temple of Saturn, had been selected. Fires were to be set and the aqueducts cut to prevent water being brought to put out the flames; it would appear that Cicero’s warnings of ‘incendiarism’ (In Cat. 2.19) had been accurate. The city had been divided up among the conspirators, who, according to Plutarch, amounted to just 100 men, a small number to carry out such ambitious plans. Lentulus now had to think of other ways of increasing the level of support. Sallust (42) writes that envoys of the Allobroges from Transalpine Gaul were in Rome complaining about the ‘rapacity of Roman officials’. As Lentulus did not have the support of the urban plebs, he decided to approach the envoys through Publius Umbrenus and Publius Gabinius, other conspirators, to invite them to join the conspiracy. We must assume Catiline himself would not have made this approach, as the Allobroges were not Romans and, as such, were unacceptable to him; his later refusal to enlist slaves into his inadequate army is another such example of his prejudices. Lentulus’ policy was risky and foolhardy as most Gallic tribes were discontented with Roman provincial rule, and their participation would have made the conspiracy much more dangerous and certainly much harder to control and could have encouraged other tribes to join.