ABSTRACT
There is little contemporary source material remaining for these years and the historian is largely dependent on later writers such as Plutarch, Appian and Sallust. Sulla’s attack on the rights of the tribunes had offended the people and
any politician who challenged his work could be assured of popular support. In order to safeguard the reforms after his retirement, Sulla had settled large numbers of his veterans on Italian soil who could be called upon to defend the rights of the Senate with arms if necessary. To ensure the continuing support of the Senate he had distributed the land of many of his political opponents to senators who would be reluctant to see it return to the descendants of their original owners; it was in their interest to work hard to maintain and support Sulla’s reforms. The first challenge to Sulla’s work came from Marcus Aemilius Lepidus,
the consul of 78, who demanded the recall of the Marians who had lost their land, return of the property and rights of Sulla’s victims and restoration of the powers of the tribunate. The Senate were slow to recognise the danger he posed and, when a group of Sullan colonists at Faesulae in Etruria were attacked by farmers whose land had been confiscated, the Senate sent both Lepidus and Catulus, his optimate colleague, to the area. The two consuls immediately quarrelled, and it is possible that Lepidus actually put himself at the head of the dispossessed farmers. The Senate was determined to avoid war but failed to give Catulus the backing he needed to suppress his colleague. After insisting the men take an oath against civil war, the Senate allowed Lepidus to become governor of Transalpine and possibly also Cisalpine Gaul for the following year. It was only when he resisted a direct demand to return to Rome to hold elections and demanded a second consulship that Lepidus was recognised as a credible threat. Fear of provoking another civil war so soon after the last one may have held back many of the senators but, when they saw the stability of the Sullan system under threat, they recognised
Lepidus as an enemy and their subsequent actions were concerted and vigorous. Lepidus sent his legate, Marcus Junius Brutus, to raise troops in
Cisalpine Gaul, where his family had clientelae, and Lepidus himself marched towards Rome at the head of an army early in 77. He was joined by the son of Cinna and by Perperna, a former governor of Sicily. As no elections had been held for 77 and there were no incoming consuls, Appius Claudius was appointed interrex. Some senators still argued strongly for negotiations but the SCU was hurriedly passed, largely due to pressure from Philippus, who had been a prominent Marian in the 80s but had fought for Sulla on his return, and Lepidus was declared a public enemy. Catulus was given proconsular imperium and put in charge of the campaign against him, and Pompey was dispatched to Cisalpine Gaul with propraetorian imperium to deal with Brutus. Plutarch (Pompey 16) writes, ‘the situation itself, therefore, demanded Pompey, who was not long in deciding what course to take’. If his intention had been to profit from Lepidus’ plans, then Pompey’s judgement to back him in the consular elections can be seen as sound. Lepidus was defeated easily and fled to Sardinia, where he died shortly afterwards, allegedly of a broken heart caused by his wife’s unfaithfulness. Pompey laid siege to the forces of Brutus in Mutina in Cisalpine Gaul and, when Brutus eventually surrendered, had him put to death despite rumours that he had agreed to spare him if he handed himself over. Such actions earned Pompey the nickname adulescentulus carnufex (The Young Butcher).1
