ABSTRACT
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 gave its Open Policy the biggest boost. Prior to 1978, China’s economy was isolated. Even after its historical opening to the world economy in 1978, China still cushioned itself from the world markets through tariffs and nontariff barriers. Entry into the WTO will eventually integrate China closely with the rest of the world economy. The rocky and lengthy process of China’s WTO bid provides us an excellent
case for observing international negotiation and bilateral relations and their international and domestic determinants. After its economic opening in 1978, China lingered for eight years at the gateway of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO until 1995), before formally requesting a seat in 1986. Between 1986 and 1989 China’s GATT accession talks went smoothly. However, since then, its accession bid has entered a rocky course. It accelerated only after 1997. How can we account for the progress and delays in China’s WTO bid? China’s WTO accession calls for intellectual answers. Synthesizing theories on external and domestic politics, two-level games
and realism, this chapter presents a two-level power politics account for China’s GATT/WTO accession. This chapter suggests that while international security circumstances and the US influenced terms for China’s WTO entry, domestic consideration and succession politics in China and the US largely conditioned the pace of China’s accession. In particular, the international distribution of US and Chinese power shaped both the leverage of the two nations and their interaction. On the other hand, leadership succession, domestic conflict over policy, and policy priority determined the willingness for US and Chinese leaders to adjust or accept the terms of an international agreement. Overall, however, domestic politics apparently assumed a larger role. Most importantly, most breakthroughs in China’s WTO accession were apparently linked directly with China’s progress in domestic economic reform.
Regarding external and domestic politics three positions emerge.1 The external-source perspective holds that the distribution of power and wealth among
nations affects domestic structure. The domestic source perspective distinguishes strong states from weak states. It suggests that strong states are independent of the public and formulate foreign policies that reflect the broad interests of the population. Under society-centered governments, conflict between different private interests and their public representatives shape foreign policy. Finally, the interdependent perspective argues that with strong structured links among states and societies, transnational forces have become important causes of foreign policy. Scholars, Putnam in particular, have perceived international negotiation as
games at both international and national levels. National leaders’ abilities to win domestic approval for the agreement (rectification in Putnam’s terms) and to alter the other side’s perception matter a great deal. Domestic preferences, coalitions, and institutions, as well as negotiators’ strategies, affect the size of win-sets, or possible agreements acceptable for domestic rectifiers.2 Pursuing this logic, Goldstein argues that leaders may reach an agreement out of imperatives in the domestic game. Milner suggests that preferences of domestic actors, political institutions, and levels of information define when international cooperation is possible. Martin argues that legislatures possess mechanisms to hold executives accountable in international cooperation and that legislature-executive interaction helps strengthen international commitments.3
