ABSTRACT
The first step in constructing the analytical framework presented in this book has been concerned with the theoretical reasons for expecting conflicting objectives and constraints across tiers of government. In this respect, following the mainstream literature, we considered the attribution of functions to different tiers of government according to criteria that are consistent with the Oates’ perfect correspondence and decentralization theorems, and with the Tiebout’s hypothesis. In addition, we emphasized that the adoption of these criteria is also consistent with the EU’s actual decision-making structure which is based on democratic federalism and informed by the principle of subsidiarity. Therefore, we stressed that the analysis developed is not only theoretically appealing but can also provide useful insights for assessing the way functions are currently attributed to different tiers of government in the EU. Finally, our attention to the attribution of functions has concentrated on the provision of local public goods because of the importance of such provisions in the policies analysed in this book, and that the related discussion has been based on assessing the pros and cons of attributing the provision of local public goods to different tiers of government in terms of allocative efficiency, equity, and stabilization.
