ABSTRACT
In chapter 1 it was maintained that philosophy of education consists largely of a critical comment on educational theory and that educational theory itself consists of a number of theories of varying scopes and complexities, ranging from simple theories about teaching to large-scale theories allied to, or associated with, some social, political or religious position. Much of the remainder of this book will be an attempt to show how general theories of education throw up topics of philosophical interest and how a philosopher of education might react to the pronouncements made in such theories. It will be useful here to indicate what would count as a topic of philosophical interest and what form a philosopher's reaction would be likely to take. By a 'topic of philosophical interest' is meant one which gives rise to questions of a conceptual nature, about the relationship between one concept and another, the relationship between 'education' and 'teaching', for example, or between 'authority' and 'power'; or one which reveals certain assumptions presupposed in an argument, assumptions which, being the basis of the argument, need to be established before the argument can be evaluated, assumptions about human nature, for example, or the nature of knowledge. Concepts, assumptions, and the arguments based on them are possible sources of philosophic interest, and the philosopher's reaction when confronted with them would be to look at the analysis of the concepts, to bring out as clearly as possible what was being said when they were used, to draw out and examine the assumptions and presuppositions involved in the argument, and then to evaluate the argument itself as being worthy of acceptance or not.
