ABSTRACT
The key factor in Lithuanian-Russian relations is power asymmetry, with Lithuania as a small state and Russia as a great power. Hans Mouritzen, the author of the ‘Finlandization’ theory, singles out four scenarios of coexistence between a great power and a small state: domination (full dependence of a small state on the influence of a great power); isolation (self-sufficiency of a small state, e.g. Switzerland); a balancing between the various influences of great powers; and, finally, obedience to a great power (e.g. Finland during the Cold War).1 Thus Lithuania had to pursue one of these scenarios in its relations with Russia. Having experienced Russia’s domination during the Soviet occupation period, Lithuania tried to avoid the first scenario. Equally, due to historical experience and the geopolitical situation, Lithuania’s isolation was almost implausible, and such a course would produce no benefit in the future. In 1994, officially declaring itself set on the course of Euro-Atlantic integration, Lithuania rejected the scenario of pursuing a subservient policy towards its big neighbour Russia.2 Thus the only remaining option was the one of a balancing act between different power centres – Russia, Europe and the United States.
