ABSTRACT
The return of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership to the OPT in accordance with the Declaration of Principles (DOP) marked a new era for the leadership and the public. The inside-outside dichotomy disappeared, the Palestinian leadership was transformed, and official institutions, which operated in a patrimonial manner, were dominated and controlled by Arafat and his Fatah ‘kitchen’. These institutions, which the agreement made structurally dependent on Israel, were further constrained by Israeli restrictions. As a result, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was unable to fulfil its obligations to its public; it was able neither to effectively confront the deteriorating economic situation, nor to alter Israel’s unwillingness to implement the agreement. This chapter will argue that the inherent weaknesses in the Palestinian-Israeli
agreements resulted in structural constraints and problems within the Authority. These weaknesses were at once political, economic and administrative. In many instances, these weaknesses left the PA in some respects hostage to the Israeli government. This had a detrimental effect, in turn, on the negotiating stance of the PLO, and consequently led to additional flawed agreements. We will first describe the two stages of the establishment of the PA, the first
of which embodies the creation of the provisional government formed by the PLO leadership after the DOP and before the election of the Legislative Council, and the second stage following elections and incorporating many of the elected parliamentarians in addition to the appointed ones. During these stages, the returning leadership took advantage of its strong public support in order to dominate the executive branch and the security apparatuses. In addition, monopolistic companies were created to provide the leadership with the financial resources needed for its political activities. This chapter will also show to what extent the implementation of agree-
ments, particularly the Economic Protocol of the Interim Agreement, resulted in poor economic performance and complete dependency on the Israeli economy. Israeli practices and weak agreements brought about a decline in the economic conditions of the Palestinian people, which in turn increased
public opposition to the leadership. The leadership responded by tightening the screws on the opposition, which further isolated and weakened it. This deteriorating political and economic performance created a rift between the government and the elected council which, despite its Fatah majority, was obliged to respond to the public’s growing anger. Finally, this chapter will examine the experience of the first Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC), its election, composition, and relationship with the executive branch, emphasizing the interaction between the two as the Council increasingly reflected the opinions of its electorate. Throughout the chapter, there will be also a follow-up on the structure and
behaviour of the leadership, both in governance and negotiations, in addition to the effect of that on the negotiations and their outcome.
