ABSTRACT

It is almost axiomatic in international relations to argue that the current international system and power relations between states are shaped by two dynamic trends – the centrifugal force inherent in the move to a multipolar world and the centripetal impulse of interdependence. The first is generated by a shift in the relative balance of global power to East Asia and South Asia from the West, hitherto the center of gravity of political and economic activity and international affairs. The second is a deepening economic, environmental and energy interdependence as demand outstrips supply, leading to the convergence of national and global interests. Under such conditions, the previous durable, tolerable hegemony exercised by a single state – the US – is understood to be “decreasingly sustainable.”1 Past practice is challenged by present realities: emergent centers of global power may create an institutionalized directorate of Great Powers acting in concert or as a coalition-based hegemony. A US National Intelligence Council report, aptly entitled Global Trends 2025 – A Transformed World, predicts a revolutionized international system, as new players gain seats at the international high table to which they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.2 In an era of growing complexity and dislocation, the emergence of China, India and the EU as new Great Powers – and the re-emergence of Russia as an old one – constitutes the central dynamic of the current and future global system. Indeed, global financial crisis is understood to have powerfully reinforced – psychologically, politically and economically – this underlying global strategic paradigm shift. Javier Solana has observed that “the crisis is accelerating the power shift from the West to the East. This is true both in terms of material resources and ideological pull.”3 Niall Fergusson has characterized the crisis as an “axis of upheaval,” with unpredictable and unintended geopolitical consequences, as it coincides with the depletion of non-renewable energy sources, a tipping point for global climate change and turbulence associated with a declining world hegemon – the US.4 The crisis does indeed appear to have caused a realignment of influence of various countries and highlighted a structural change in the global economy, characterized by an accelerated power shift toward Asia and a multipolar global order. BRICs, especially China, enjoy a stronger relative global position to the US and Europe, whose standing as a credible model has been weakened. Creditor autocracies now enjoy greater influence over, and

independence from, debtor democracies and are less constrained in their behavior. Protectionism, resource nationalism, the continued Balkanization of the Internet and the weakening of core alliances all testify to the reassertion of state control over economies and societies. Such policies risk creating an inwardlooking “beggar-thy-neighbor” environment, in which zero-sum balance of power logic is the dominant force. If this becomes the predominant trend, challengers to US hegemony may well loosen ties with the political West, and emergent Great Powers could increase political, security and financial ties between each other, creating a parallel order. Certainly, increasing power and status is the stated national strategic goal of all emergent Great Powers, as the authors who focused on the emergent Great Powers in Part III of this volume have observed. Bates Gill argues that China is as an emergent center of global power, with its growing diplomatic and economic weight in global affairs, deepening integration into a more globalized world, and its increasing ability to shape the future world order. Pavel Baev notes that Russia seeks a restoration of its Great Power status within a globalized multipolar rather than unipolar or non-polar world. Russia believes that the “post-Cold War model of globalization shaped by US domination and based on Western norms and values is breaking down” and interstate relations in the 2010s will be characterized by “tougher competition and less binding cooperation.” Thierry Tardy argues that, with 27 states, the EU is one of a kind in the international system, a unique hybrid actor that has the potential to act as an independent pole within a multipolar system. In a globalizing world, it can maximize its soft power and translate its global economic role into global political influence, so consolidating its role as a nascent global player. Siddharth Varadarajan discusses India as an emerging economic and democratic Great Power, arguing that “since the end of the Cold War and especially after India tested a series of nuclear devices in May 1998 and openly proclaimed its nuclear weapons status, Indian strategic thinkers have argued that the world is ‘multipolar’ or ‘polycentric’.” Historically, with few exceptions, hegemonic transition has occurred as challengers accumulate political-ideological, military and economic power until a tipping point is reached and a paradigm shift enacted through violent overthrow. Hegemonic transition is therefore considered inherently destabilizing and turbulent. However, in an age of nuclear deterrence, military and coercive force-led hegemonic challenge is untenable. Such an approach would destroy the very object that the transition would seek to secure – the leadership of a viable and functional global system. Moreover, when we examine market-authoritarian Russia and China, there appears to be no ideational challenge from these emergent Great Powers and potential hegemonic challengers, with free-market capitalism the accepted global default system.5 Pavel Baev characterizes Russia’s governance model as a “quasi-democratic and hyper-centralized system of power based on a symbiosis between top bureaucracy and big business,” which has proven vulnerable in the face of the global financial crisis. Indeed, in September 2009 President Medvedev himself, in a remarkably frank article, criticized Rus-

sia’s “humiliating” dependence on raw materials, as well as its “inefficient economy, a semi-Soviet social sphere, an immature democracy, negative demographic trends, an unstable Caucasus.”6 Bates Gill emphasizes the importance China places on bilateral and multilateral cooperation within key international organizations and international law, as they are considered the most appropriate instruments to mediate challenges to global and regional stability within a “democratic world order.” When turning to India and the EU, we can also note qualifications and restraints that undercut Great Power hegemonic challenger considerations. Siddharth Varadarajan recognizes that India, as a rising power, “is not preoccupied with peer competitors and is wary of getting ensnared in rivalry between the Great Powers. The Indian conception of a stable world order, at the end of the day, is one that is based on cooperation driven by shared interests and common perceptions about where the principal threats and challenges to security lie. Such a framework will still allow for the pursuit of national interests by individual countries, so long as the temptation to think of power in zero-sum terms is kept firmly at bay.” Thierry Tardy argues that the EU, while being “potentially wellequipped and relatively strong” in practice,

suffers from a number of key weaknesses that are true limitations to the expression of its potential. More worrying is the fact that the decades ahead will in all likelihood offer an international environment that will not work to Europe’s advantage.