ABSTRACT
Before delving into an analysis of whether the theory accurately describes the causal mechanisms that lead to different capitalist styles, it is useful to observe some of the broad patterns that countries have displayed over time. In this chapter, I begin by illustrating patterns across time and space for the financial system variables of interest, where data are available: countries’ general reliance on equities markets, to which corporate ownership outcomes closely correspond; government ownership of banks; and the size of public pension funds. It is difficult to get a consistent cross-national measure of the degree to which banking institutions cater to the agricultural sector, so this is saved for the case studies. I then look at how financial systems changed following a change in the country’s constitution. As the theory articulates, dramatic changes to political institutions will likely correspond to changes in financial institutions. But more fundamental to the subsequent financial structure are the new political bargains struck among actors since the political institutions are seen as preserving and biasing the evolutionary path of the bargains. So, in the third section, I test for correlations between the financial variables and government partisanship, which proxies for labor’s power versus capital owner’s power, at the time new bargains were struck. Because it is difficult to get a consistent and accurate measure of farmers’ power across countries, in the fourth section I look within the United States to see whether legislators’ votes on key laws correlate with the value of agricultural production in their home constituency. Fifth, I test whether countries with more consensus forms of political institutions exhibit less financial change over time. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the results.
