ABSTRACT
Depending on the epistemological access to the notion of citizenship, scholars in general subscribe either to a normative account of citizenship or to the functionalist one.
Therefore, some scholars might be interested in an ideal of citizenship. Sometimes, this assumes a standard of citizenship referring to a lost ideal of Ancient Greece or the Roman Empire, where citizens were higher beings in ethical, ontological (Greek Polis) and legal terms (Roman Empire). Not only were they believed to make intelligent and purposive judgments, but also expected to pursue common goods. This view idealizes a specific historical form of citizenship by canonizing it into a universal standard of citizenship. It is usually accompanied by a critical stance towards contemporary types of citizenship bemoaning their liberal, thin or underdeveloped shape.1 Further normative approaches to citizenship attempt to abstract from specific historical accounts of citizenship and anchor it in a system of liberty and equality. The realization of liberty and equality is therefore regarded as a prerequisite for citizenship in a democratic regime. Probably the most prominent thinker in this field was John Rawls, who viewed modern citizenship through a magnifying glass of societal justice. Against the background of the hypothetical veil of ignorance, a universal form of citizenship (attached to the principles of liberty and difference) is to be established. It is believed to reconcile conflicting interests and ideologies in a diverse society.2
