ABSTRACT
It is arguable that philosophers have employed the notion of consent in arguments to vindicate citizens’ duties and sovereigns’ claims to authority at least since Socrates voiced the opinion of the Laws of Athens in Plato’s Crito. In modern times, which is to say from the middle of the sixteenth century to the present day, consent arguments have been prominent amongst the answers that philosophers have given to the problem of justifying a regime of citizens’ duties. It is easy to see why consent arguments serve as an attractive solution to the Philosophical Problem. If citizens consent to assume such duties, one is tempted to conclude straight away that that’s that: they’ve assumed them voluntarily so they’ve got them – though we shall have more to say about this very simple conclusion later. For the moment, we need to get clear about the variety of arguments that come under the consent rubric. There are important differences that need to be established. I shall outline the salient distinctions in a schematic fashion and elaborate the differences in the course of our discussion.
