ABSTRACT
When Sartre, in the Notebooks, argues that “violence implies nihilism,” he has something very specifi c in mind. He is concerned with the sense in which violence can be the symptom of a weakness, especially given the “theoretical supremacy to action accomplished in conformity with laws over an action that is accomplished against such laws.” 1 To conform to laws entails power, since laws mark off the space of the possible, and power can be thought of in terms of the ability to fully inhabit and act within such a space. To conform specifi cally to human laws or demands, thus to fully inhabit the space that they mark off, involves the dynamic potential for political power, if we recall here Arendt’s conception of power emerging from acting in concert. Violence disrupts this conduit of power, breaks off the relation thanks to which action realizes the possibilities of power, but in such a way that takes the form of a particular kind of affi rmation: “I may prefer the nonlawful; that is, I can place destruction as a means of obtaining an end above respect for what is. In this case, I affi rm the inessentialness of everything that exists in relation to me and my goal.”2
