ABSTRACT
It was noted in Chapter 1 that discussions of autonomy in bioethics are beset by the Gertrude Stein Problem: that there is no shared understanding of autonomy that is suffi ciently thick to serve as the basis for any analysis of this concept that is widely accepted. It was also noted there that, despite this, it is still possible to develop a capturing account of autonomy that, while partially stipulative, both captures most of the connotative contours of this concept as it is used in contemporary philosophical discussion and is able to explain why those that it does not capture should be excluded as being part of the understanding of autonomy proper. This capturing account of autonomy was the account of practical autonomy that was developed in the last Chapter. It was also noted in Chapter 1 that explicitly outlining the connotative contours of the contemporary philosophical conception of autonomy will enable one to assess just how divergent current understandings of autonomy are. This assessment, it was noted, could serve two useful purposes. First, it could, perhaps, show that the philosophical understanding of autonomy is not as multifaceted as it might at fi rst appear-that this is simply an illusion generated by the widespread usage of this concept in ways that do not track its generally accepted connotations.1 Second, if this is so, then this assessment would support a claim made on behalf of a capturing account of autonomy to be considered to be a (if not the) core account of autonomy against which claims about autonomy in discussions of political philosophy, moral philosophy, and both applied ethics in general, and bioethics in particular, should be assessed.
