ABSTRACT
The realm of international relations comprises today not only states and global regimes such as the United Nations, but also many international organizations with a mandate in regional peace and security. Although these organizations, such as the AU, the OAS, the EU, or NATO have made significant headway over the last decade and are regarded as key actors in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, their role remains under-studied. How have they become prominent security actors? What are their comparative advantages and disadvantages? What are the implications for the United Nations as the prime actor responsible for peace and security? What are the challenges ahead? The interest shown by policy-makers in regional organizations is fairly
recent and it has been spurred by some changes in the global scene. The first is the realization that the majority of threats and security problems are primarily regional rather than local, national, or global.1
Today it is difficult to envision a security problem that originates and is neutralized strictly within the confines of a single state. Be it inter-state or intra-state armed conflict, proliferation of deadly diseases, illegal immigration, or failed states, contemporary threats usually have a regional pattern that calls for regional mechanisms to confront them. Second, although the sovereignty axiom is still prominent, statesseduced by the potentially positive effects of economic integration and suffering the effects of globalization-are showing signs of being less orthodox and more malleable about external interventions. With increased frequency, humanitarian norms have been the source of calls for intervention to halt or prevent gross violations of human rights. Third, regional institutions have been encouraged to take on a security
mandate as a way to cope with the frailty of the United Nations. In the past, mostly in the context of the Cold War, regional institutions and regional conflicts were subordinated to the particular interest of the superpowers.2 As former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated
in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, “the Cold War impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter.” This judgment seems justified as long as it was based on action by the OAS with regard to Cuba (1962) and the Dominican Republic (1965), the League of Arab States in Lebanon (1976-83), or the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) action in Chad (1981).3
After the Cold War, however, a renewed interest in the global level and in the possibility of a new approach in terms of international peace was generated. Yet, the weak financial conditions of the United Nations, the poor record of its peacekeeping missions in the 1990s (e.g. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and UNOSOM in Somalia), and political pressure from Western powers for reform served as stumbling blocks on the UN’s road toward complete self-sufficiency in peace and security.4 This has been acknowledged even by the UN itself; on numerous occasions the secretary-general has recognized that the organization “lacks the capacity, resources and expertise” to address all the problems and therefore the support of regional organizations is “both necessary and desirable.”5 In 1994, the issuing of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) by President Bill Clinton was another blow to the universal aspirations of the UN. In the wake of the disastrous mission in Somalia, the directive prevented the United States from using peacekeeping operations as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. Interestingly, as a complement to America’s unilateral actions, it foresaw supporting the improvement of regional organizations’ peacekeeping capabilities. In 2000, this point was reinforced in PDD 71 of February 2000, which identified the strengthening of the capacity of regional organizations as a major objective. It is clear today that the UN has neither enough resources nor poli-
tical will to engage with all security problems. These impediments have, hence, paved the way for greater regional involvement. As Haas already pointed out during the Cold War, “regional security arrangements grow in direct proportion to disappointment with the UN collective security system.”6 The beginning of this renewed trend toward the regionalization of security mechanisms arrived with the Economic Community of West African Countries’ (ECOWAS) armed intervention in Liberia in 1990 (see Chapter 3). Liberated from the suffocating forces of the Cold War, West African states seized the opportunity to take responsibility for their own interests. As a result of the growth of regional action, this book presents a
critical account of the role and capacities of international organizations in the realm of regional peace and security.
