ABSTRACT
In the early 1990s the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the transformation of Central Asia from a coherent region into a patchwork of independent sovereign states. This disintegration is something of an illusion, however, as most parts have subsequently engaged in a process of reintegration.1 In fact, Caucasia and Central Asia have many common denominators and patterns of regional interaction. The Soviet Union gave the two areas a common infrastructure and political culture, and its legacy permeates economic, social, and cultural life. They also have a common history, being part of the Silk Road in historic times. The route was central to cultural transmission by linking merchants, pilgrims, and soldiers from China to the Mediterranean for thousands of years. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to lump all eight of these “Asian” states together. In fact, the three Caucasian states are in Europe, whereas the Central Asian states are firmly part of the Asian political dynamic. In any case, connecting points are still obvious. The most salient one is the hegemonic role of Russia. Developments in the post-Soviet space over the last 20 years have
brought to evidence the existence of a state-Russia-that dominates the political and economic interactions through the formation and reshaping of various institutional patterns. There are two groups of factors that support Russian domination and hegemony. The first one flows from the previous status of the Russian Federation in the former USSR as the nucleus of a vast political space. With the lowering of the Soviet flag over the Kremlin, Russia’s position as a catalyst of the disintegration processes in the former Soviet region has been reversed.2
The second, Fedunyak argues, is connected to the current agenda of international relations post September 11. Over the years Moscow has efficiently played out the terrorist agenda to promote its own interests and to foment the reintegration processes in the post-Soviet space (2004). MacFarlane adds that “it is clear that Russian policy-makers
are uncomfortable with the idea of a prominent role being granted to external actors in dealing with conflict in the former Soviet space.”3
