A drastic change dating from the 1960s led to the remarkable rise of an intellectual trend in the 1990s which has come to be referred to as ‘the renaissance of pragmatism’ (Joas 1993: 56,75; Sandbothe 2000; Böhler et al. 2003: 172). Whereas the mutual criticism of Habermas and Rorty is a central feature of the recent phase of the renaissance, the debate has intensified in the past decade or two around the issue of regulative ideas, centring in particular on the position of Apel, the philosopher who has played a vital role in laying the groundwork for the upsurge of interest in pragmatism and of seeing it in relation to Critical Theory.1 Although the renaissance and the developments that led up to it form the background of the account offered here, the aim of the chapter is to clarify the relationship between Critical Theory and pragmatism since the drastic redirection of the 1960s. The leading interest is in the nature and character of contemporary Critical Theory as it has been taking new shape under the impact of its incorporation of a range of pragmatist ideas.