Sources of success of the Italian right

This book began with a general question concerning the determinants of the electoral performance of right-wing parties in Italy. This question led to the examination of why the right and not the left profited electorally following the remarkable collapse of the DC – the party that had represented the centrist sensibility of the Italian electorate for several decades. Our response was that the right made better use of populism by connecting it to other ideological elements that resonated with Italian society and by using specific political and extra-political resources to optimise electoral appeal. In this chapter, we will frame the performance of the right in a comparative context, summarise the main and the peripheral elements of populism identified in the party chapters, explain their contribution to the success of the right through an analysis of the values of the electorate and draw some general conclusions on the fit between the right-wing voting bloc and the institutional framework. In the following chapter, we will review the findings more broadly from a theoretical perspective and examine what lessons can be learnt for Europe more generally. Throughout the book we have emphasised the contribution of a populist

ideological framework to the success of the right, a way to use politically the category of ‘the people’ as a metaphor for a collective identity – of an emotionally loaded belonging to a social category. It is a way to thematise and politicise the demos beyond the boundaries of formal citizenship as defined by the nation-state. It is a reactive response to multiculturalism. We shifted our explanation of the success of the right away from other approaches that mainly focus on the electoral space left available by the collapse of the DC. The first point that has to be recalled from the introductory chapters is that the success of the right was not due to a simple continuation of the success of the DC during the First Republic. After all, the DC – while a moderate party – generally did not encourage views such as the xenophobia of the LN or the consumerist views of Forza Italia or the sympathetic interpretations of fascism found within the MSI-AN. And its patriotism was moderated by its allegiance to universalist Christian values. Thus, the rapid affirmation of a right-wing coalition and its survival over the years – even if with alternate fortunes – requires an explanation, which we have provided by pointing to the

innovative aspects of each of the parties of the right, and which we will now consider contextually as a coalition. We have argued that the answer provided by some analysts – that the Italian electorate is fundamentally socially conservative and would not have preferred a coalition of secular leftist parties – is not fully satisfactory. One should note that the ex-DC currents flowed into both coalitions. Moreover, not only did the left not succeed, but neither did the forces that tried to re-package in more modern terms the moderate Christian views of the discredited DC. The various catholic political formations that emerged within the centre left and centre right did not win a substantial proportion of the vote. Rather, completely different formations such as FI and the AN emerged successfully in the aftermath of tangentopoli, and small regionalist formations such as the LN came to play an important role in Italian politics. Much emphasis has been attached to the advantage that these forces pos-

sessed in emerging at a time when they could fill an empty political space: the space within the right left free by the collapsed DC and also the space freed within the left in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. But even a ‘displacement’ theory based on a static conception of political space and the resulting advantages of political opportunities coming from timing and positioning strategies is not fully satisfactory. The emergent Italian right of the early 1990s did more than just fill an empty space. In Italy, as in other EU countries, right-wing parties re-invented themselves and in the process redefined the concept of the right, whose conceptual domain expanded from the socially libertarian message of the likes of Pim Fortuyn to the social interventionist intents of the Italian social right. Thus, the right did more than just inherit a victory – it created the conditions for it. In this chapter, we will bring together the lesson of ideological innovation that the Italian right learned in the context of an evolving European right, but also a consideration of the impact of institutional changes on the success of the right – such as changes in the electoral law. Thus, as suggested by Pasquino, on the one hand, we investigate the success of populism in Italy with reference to some key social and cultural features of Italian society and, on the other hand, we will discuss the specifically political-institutional factors that have facilitated populist formations (Pasquino 2008). As mentioned the Italian institutional framework has altered in radical

ways in recent years. In explaining the evolution of the right, one must emphasise the impact of the Italian institutional architecture and of the political debates that have accompanied the many attempts at reforming it. The collapse of the party system that ensued from the corruption scandals

of the early 1990s sparked a wide-ranging debate on the institutional architecture of the Italian system at all levels of government. These included debates pertaining to the institutional framework that organises political competition and decision-making, and to the institutional framework that organises relations between the state and the economy, and the state and civil society. As mentioned previously, the initial success of the right was

dependent upon a change in the Italian electoral law from proportional representation to a predominantly majoritarian system that forced coalition behaviour among the parties. The right was more able to form effective coalitions due mainly, but not exclusively, to the strength of Berlusconi’s control of his coalition. The stimulus to form cohesive coalitions resulted from the polarisation of the party system, which emerged as a consequence of the new electoral law, but the right was more able to respond to this need. Even with the frequent recurrent squabbles we have documented, the multiple sources of power of a leader such as Berlusconi enabled the coalition to be kept together after elections much more effectively than the centre left has managed. Electorally, the right profited from the innovative institutional solution that

Berlusconi devised: two different coalitions, one in the north with the LN and one in the south with AN. The change in electoral law was made possible by a 1993 referendum that reflected the political entrepreneurship of a small group of liberal politicians, but above all it reflected an ideological change in the Italian population that reacted against what it identified as one of the main causes of tangentopoli: the proportional electoral law that contributed to the perpetuation of an unaccountable political class that had gone unpunished for its misdemeanours for decades. The Italian clientelistic system was increasingly unaffordable and spurred rebellion in business and professional elites, which the magistrates interpreted. Thus, while stressing the importance of institutional developments, it is also important to emphasise the ideological changes that had set Italian political values at loggerheads with the Italian political offering. The factors that brought the right to power were to a substantial extent

connected to expectations of economic policy, to worries about the dilapidation of state resources and to concern about the inefficiencies of state services. In this sense, the success of the right was rooted in both its ability to produce a discourse that could chime with the culture of a changing country, but also specific expectations about economic performance and system innovation. However, the right in government would encounter insurmountable problems when it came to matching expectations and promises with actual policy action and results – for instance in delivering liberal policies that would benefit consumers, improve the workings of the service sector and de-regulate the overly regulated professions. At the end of the first decade of the new century, a new wave of disaffection

with politics is clearly manifest and relates to the widespread realisation that politics has found new ways of persisting with the old practices of misappropriating and wasting societal resources. In the opinion of many observers, the transition from the First Republic was never accomplished. Necessary institutional reforms, such as the correction of the system of perfect bicameralism, which slows the legislative process, or the strengthening of the role of a prime minister hostage to squabbling coalitions, have not been undertaken. The second Prodi government paid a high price for these unaccomplished reforms. It was a fractious coalition which could not take

Sources of

decisions, had a constant low rating in public opinion and a short duration. However, throughout the history of the Second Republic, the right has also remained torn by internal conflicts and, given the precedent of protracted personality conflicts, even new developments such as the PdL party project do not necessarily guarantee additional stability. Given this renewed bout of re-invention, now is a good time to review the

right’s performance throughout the entire 1993-2008 period and to assess prospects for the future.