ABSTRACT
The Vietnamese Government’s approach used during the two cases appears to be very different, with one situation requiring and incorporating international players and inter-agency cooperation, and the other case being dominated by one ministry, the MOD. Officials in these cases used different approaches to policy making, saw different levels of results, and yet historically developed protected values were factors in both studies. While Vietnamese authorities made decisions in an effort to protect the country of Vietnam, including the territory, people, economy, and the Party, the degree to which these factors were important shows how the case studies were different. In the landmine case, history appeared to be the dominant factor that affected the decision-making process, particularly since the landmine and UXO problem is directly linked to Vietnam’s wartime past. As a result, the MOD remained focused on minimizing foreign influence in Vietnam, protecting the territory and national sovereignty, and not losing sight of any potential external threats. On the other hand, the AI case had no such links to the past, and yet historically developed protected values were still called upon, particularly the need for social order, for citizens to recognize their role and responsibility in preventing the spread of AI, and ensuring the stability of the Government and Party. While these values were important factors, it appeared they did not dominate the process or the discourse of the AI problem. Instead, officials were quite successful at combining lessons learned from the past, protected values, and current day national priorities such as economic growth. By using two different case studies involving varying ministries and seeing that there are different approaches to problem-solving, it became clear that each ministry develops its own objectives, information sets, clients, and identities. Each ministry essentially creates a subculture of belief that is different from the other, and decision-making is embedded in each subculture. The MOD is clearly centered on an identity that requires constant adherence to the rules because of the strong belief that the nation and people are under constant threat. Meanwhile, ministries such as the MOH and the MARD are moving toward more moderate approaches in which they see inaction as more of a danger than external players. The identity of these latter ministries is not dependent on protecting the people and territory of Vietnam, but their continued existence is dependent on ensuring
the stability and legitimacy of the Party. Thus, while history has helped Vietnamese officials develop a certain rule set, case-by-case analysis is necessary to make proper decisions under varying circumstances, as was evidenced by these two case studies. One contact explained that there are two types of situations that decisionmakers are faced with in Vietnam. He called them “regular issues” and “irregular issues.” He said that regarding regular issues, there is always an established solution because the Party has an exact procedure to be used in certain situations. He noted that these regular issues are usually broad issues that are addressed in the five-year plans and the procedures identify specific rules and roles to guide the plan. These regular issues may include social or political issues that have been ongoing in Vietnam for several years or even decades, such as the landmine problem. In the case of the landmines and unexploded ordnance, the problem has existed for so long that many other concerns have taken priority. On the other hand, irregular issues include situations that arise that require immediate action or at least relatively quick action. The Vietnamese interviewee explained that regarding irregular issues, government officials meet to discuss the matter and this is when rules of appropriateness come into play. He said the number one rule is to “protect the Party’s interest.”1 Thus, protecting the Party’s interest is a protected value that informs the rules which are used to set boundaries for policy making. After examining the AI problem in Vietnam and how the officials chose to deal with this problem, it appears that AI could be classified as an irregular issue since it was relatively new, it received international attention, it put both the people and the territory at risk, and it needed to be dealt with quickly and effectively. While historical processes may help us to understand the Government’s reaction to the AI problem, there are also other factors that had to be considered in order to apply rules and protected values during the decisionmaking process. In an effort to apply this thinking to the two case studies, I must look at both situations together to compare the behavior and practices of Vietnamese officials. Both the landmine and the AI issues require information sharing, collaboration with other ministries and provincial officials, cooperation with international donors and foreign governments, UN participation, education campaigns, comprehensive strategies to defeat the problem, and timely and effective decision-making. It appears that Vietnamese officials have accomplished each of these tasks when dealing with the threat of AI, or at least have made effective attempts with each of these goals. Although, in the case of the landmine problem, Vietnamese officials have yet to collaborate, coordinate, share vital information, educate the public, or develop a comprehensive mine action strategy. Nevertheless, in both situations the value or goal of protecting the Party, in addition to protecting the territory and the people, was never compromised, and in fact, was actually accomplished and emphasized. MOD officials upheld these protected values by limiting the areas in which a landmine survey or landmine clearance could take place. They also strictly monitored all foreign workers in the central provinces to alleviate any threat to the
nation. By doing so, the national survey was limited to five provinces and while over 45,000 pieces of war remnants were cleared, hundreds of thousands of pieces of UXO remain scattered throughout Vietnam. Thus, in this case, the protected values led to limited action and sometimes, inaction on the part of the MOD. Conversely, Vietnamese officials used the AI problem as an opportunity to legitimize the Party’s rule and to reiterate the State’s role as protector of the Vietnamese people. By taking a proactive approach to the AI problem and by coordinating both internally and with foreign governments, the people likely had more faith in the Party because their own health and financial stability was being protected as a result of the Government’s actions. The successes of the Government in this case were multiple: the economy and tourism industry were secured, the Communist Party and Government increased legitimacy, and through international cooperation, Vietnam became a model for over 30 other governments. In the case of the AI problem, the use of protected values combined with a modern and open approach led to swift and effective action. One reason that the Vietnamese may have made appropriate and efficient decisions in the case of AI could have been the fact that they had recently dealt with SARS, so they had a successful model from which to build. SARS hit Vietnam in March 2003 and AI was first detected in Vietnam in December 2003. It was recognized that Vietnam had gained good experience in responding to a large-scale, infectious foreign animal disease outbreak since SARS, and these experiences helped greatly in the decision-making process in containing AI outbreaks. Vietnam was successful in containing SARS and by using a similar approach of transparency and cooperation, officials have also been successful at containing AI outbreaks. Additionally, Vietnamese officials were provided with the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases by the WHO which provides a common framework to strengthen the capacity needed to prevent and fight against pandemics. This book provided guidance to decision-makers and laid out a regional strategy to help countries meet the surveillance and response requirements in order to reduce the risk of emerging diseases. In the case of the landmine problem in Vietnam, this particular problem has existed for over 30 years, there is no previous model to determine what actions have worked and have not worked, there are no regional books laying out a clear strategy. The problem has lingered on for so long that there is no sense of urgency in taking care of the matter, even though there are approximately 2,000 casualties every year as a result of landmines and UXO while only 52 people have died of AI in the past four years. As a result, decision-making and policy implementation regarding this 30 year old problem is slower and draws less attention from officials. At the end of this chapter there are timelines showing action taken in regard to the AI threat and the landmine threat (see Boxes 1 and 2). The AI timeline indicates that over a three and one half year period, many decisions and actions were taken to prevent the spread of AI. However, the landmine timeline indicates that it took that same amount of time just to negotiate the MOU and to get
the Prime Minister’s approval for the first phase of the landmine impact survey. Additionally, it took the Vietnamese Government 20 years to allow international organizations to conduct mine clearance in the country. Clearly, there is a strong historical element related to the issue of landmines in Vietnam as well as foreigners working in sensitive areas and therefore, the MOD is slow to take action on this issue. Another difference in the case studies in terms of timing is that Vietnamese officials are approaching the AI problem and solutions with long term prospects. They have plans that reach into 2015 and these plans are written and proposals, policies, and steps are already being taken to begin implementation. For example, the government hopes to move poultry from backyard farms to industrial processing facilities in the next five to ten years. These plans aim to have 40 percent of the total poultry flock raised by industrial production by the end of 2007, 50 percent by 2010, and 70 percent by 2015.2 This would require a complete overhaul of the agricultural sector in Vietnam and would change the living standards of most Vietnamese. This project will be extremely complex considering the necessary educational transformation, industrialization, and agricultural changes that would occur if many of the current chicken farmers have to process their stock in factories. These are more than just ideas however, as senior officials are already putting these plans into action. Alternatively, the MOD is approaching the national landmine impact survey in the context of present tense, and likely even in the context of the past. There does not seem to be a larger strategy to eradicate the problem of landmines over the next five, ten, or 20 years. Even in terms of a national landmine impact survey, the Vietnamese Government is not ready to allow research activity to be conducted outside of designated and approved central provinces. The MOD is allowing the national impact survey to proceed only one year at time and within designated and approved areas. One Vietnamese contact working for an international NGO in Hà Nội said, “This kind of patchwork process can not continue, otherwise the survey will never be completed. It takes too much time and money to negotiate new terms every year.”3 Vietnamese officials need to develop a broader and longer term strategy to deal effectively with this issue. While the AI case provides a lens into a transitioning Vietnam, a nation that is opening up to the outside world and beginning to cooperate more with international organizations; the landmine study is a reminder that suspicion and caution toward outsiders still exists and sometimes still prevails. Further, the landmine study demonstrates how history can have a lasting affect on modern day policy making. Both studies show that there is a kind of obsession among political authorities with social and political stability and as a result, action or inaction are almost always in an effort to accomplish these ends. In light of the historical context with which these two cases were framed, they are both quite different. As mentioned above, there are direct links between Vietnam’s wartime past, foreign invasion, territorial vulnerabilities, and the current landmine and UXO problem. Even without these direct links though, it is likely that issues handled by the MOD are often weighed down with historical themes,
particularly the themes of national defense, sovereignty, constant threats, and so forth. It is the Army’s job and thus the MOD’s responsibility to protect the territory and the Vietnamese people and to ensure national independence, and they clearly work to this end regardless of the long term benefits that some projects may offer. There are no direct links between Vietnam’s wartime history and the threat of AI and yet this disease is still viewed as a threat to the people, the Party, and the economy. Therefore, Government officials continued to reiterate some of the main themes that were discussed earlier in this book including the need for social order, citizen duty toward the country, regime stability, and of course, the existence of a threat to the Vietnamese way of life. However, unlike the MOD, the MARD and the MOH are not necessarily in the business of protecting territorial sovereignty, but it is their job to ensure the health and safety of the Vietnamese people and continue rural and economic development. The difference in these duties does not mean that the latter ministries had to abandon the historically developed protected values, but there was a difference in how much weight those values carried with each case. Given that the landmine problem continues to be framed in the context of the past, these enduring values are very significant to MOD officials, while the AI issue is seen as a modern problem with near term repercussions, so the historical issues therefore do not carry as much weight. In the AI case, the protected values were still relevant, but they were balanced with current views of the growing economy and the desire for stability and security in all sectors. Finally, I want to address how this knowledge can apply to the broader decision-making process in Vietnam. These two case studies have shown how the MOD, the MARD, and the MOH make decisions, or at least what factors they take into consideration during the policy making process. However, regarding national decisions that require consensus or those that require input from various ministries, it is important to recognize that within Vietnam each ministry is ranked and those ministers that hold seats on the Politburo are known as representing the most influential ministries (see Appendix C). As of April 2006, only two ministers were elected to seats on the Politburo: the Minister of Public Security holds the number two seat and the Minister of Defense holds the eighth seat. The other 12 members consist of Party Secretaries, the Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Ministers. Therefore, within the 26 ministries, the MOD is quite influential and, thus, the decision-making approach of this ministry is noteworthy. While some of the other ministries may be taking on more moderate practices, when it comes to decisions made by the Politburo or Central Committee, it is important to understand and recognize the practices and political behavior of MOD, of which the landmine case study provides one example.
