ABSTRACT
In the preceding chapters we have looked in detail at Bayle’s position with respect to a number of central theses of Cartesian and Malebranchean metaphysics, including mind-body dualism, occasionalism, and the res extensa account of matter. In this fi nal chapter I take a somewhat broader view and consider Bayle’s assessment of Cartesianism taken as a system. Taking my cue from Bayle himself, I approach the issue through consideration of the promise and limits of mechanism. From the outset it must be acknowledged that Bayle’s limited competence in mathematical and experimental questions conspired to make of him a mere observer in the development of natural science. Still, Bayle’s views repay careful examination not only for what they reveal about the philosophical issues confronting mechanism at the close of the seventeenth century, but because Bayle is intensely interested in the rich implications the mechanist program holds for natural theology. The discussion is of particular interest since Bayle is led to assess the relative coherence of Malebranche’s metaphysical system vis-à-vis not only Aristotelianism and other Christian competitors, but also what Bayle dubs “Naturalism”—that is, a form of atheistic materialism. As I shall argue, the analysis holds deep implications for the global interpretation of Bayle’s thought.
