What is doping?

In view of the increased priority given to the fight against doping since 1999 both by governments and sporting authorities, one might be forgiven for believing that there exists a clear definition of what doping is. This is not, however, the case, as can be seen from the evident pragmatism of the (circular) definition used by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA): ‘Doping is defined as the occurrence of one or more of the anti-doping rule violations set out in Article 2.1 through Article 2.8 of the Code’ (WADA 2003: 8). Doping is simply defined as infringement of WADA’s doping regulations. In other words, doping is whatever WADA at any moment assesses it to be. On the basis of a definition that is void of content, the rules of doping

risk taking on an entirely random character. This WADA has accepted, presumably driven by the concern that any attempt to be more specific as regards the content of their definition of doping would either render it too narrow or too broad. If, for example, doping was defined as ‘the use of artificially produced performance-enhancing substances’, anabolic steroids, EPO and suchlike would be prohibited but not doping by using the performer’s own blood or by chewing the coca leaf. If, on the other hand, it was defined broadly as ‘all performance-enhancing substances’, then the definition would include blood-doping and coca leaf chewing – but to them would have to be added hitherto accepted energy boosters such as chocolate, cola and energy bars, which athletes consume to prevent them collapsing during long-term physical exertion. There are perhaps those who will claim that an energy bar is not a per-

formance-enhancing substance, since it simply contributes to the maintenance of blood sugar levels, or in other words keeps the body in balance. But the same argument could be used to defend giving athletes testosterone. For example, it could be argued that a sporting event such as the Tour de France is an activity that causes physical degeneration, and since strenuous branches of sport are not prohibited, the least those in charge can do is to keep an eye on the athlete’s health and if, for example, their testosterone level falls, offer them a compensatory dose that carries no risk. WADA avoids having to take issue with this kind of reasoning by

choosing a vacuous definition of doping. In so doing, they have forearmed

themselves against such difficulties as the Council of Europe created for itself in its 1963 ruling that doping was:

the administration to or the use by, a competing athlete of any substance foreign to the body or any physiological substance taken in abnormal quantity or by an abnormal route of entry into the body, with the sole intention of increasing in an artificial and unfair manner his performance in competition.