ABSTRACT
The purpose of this chapter is to show that if we read at face value the passages in the Tractatus that claim that objects, reality, the solipsistic self and the mystical cannot be put into words, an analytical approach cannot apply. If we take as the starting point that there is nothing that can be said about the mystical, the mystical cannot be said to exist or not exist. However, if we accept the hypothesis that it is possible to read the Tractatus from a mystical perspective, we can then observe what method would follow from such an interpretation. I shall argue that considering the Tractatus in light of this hypothesis, that if the end of the book is to signify what cannot be put into words, the method one must apply is the one we fi nd in the Tractatus. This method follows from Wittgenstein’s aim to draw limits to the expressions of thought. Related to Wittgenstein’s thoughts on philosophy is the method of doubt, namely that doubt exists only when there is something that can be said, but after a period of doubt, both doubt and the desire to express what cannot be put into words no longer exist. In both the case of setting limits and of doubting, the aim is to signify what cannot be put into words, which includes the mystical.
