ABSTRACT
The collapse of Sri Lankan peace negotiations in Geneva in late October 2006, which was preceded by a presumed Tamil Tiger suicide bomb attack on a Sri Lankan bus convoy a week prior that killed more than 90 navy personnel, represented the latest iteration in the see-saw between violent encounters and settlement negotiations in the country’s postindependence history of protracted ethnic conflict. The Geneva talks, brokered by Norwegian mediators who had been patiently engaged as interlocutors since achieving a landmark cease-fire agreement in 2002, ostensibly collapsed over the means of delivering humanitarian relief: the Tigers wanted overland shipment to the besieged Jaffna peninsula, whereas the Sri Lankan government insisted on delivery of aid by sea. But, indeed, there was no success in even reaching agreement in these talks, and in the end the failure was chalked up to mistrust, to the on-the-ground strengthening of both sides for a new major military encounter, and the unwillingness or inability of the international community to leverage the parties into making progress. Consequently, despite a cease-fire on paper, deaths in the Sri Lankan conflict in 2006 topped more than 3,000 and the protracted war carried on; the “peace process” was more hope than reality. The war recurred and indeed intensified into 2007 and 2008, and the parties appear determined (again) to pursue a military victory.
