ABSTRACT
Procedures The Convention on Fundamental Rights had operated without precise procedural rules, an oversight that undoubtedly complicated its organisation and delayed the outcome. These lessons were duly registered. Although Laeken did not determine actual procedures for the Convention it did confirm that there would be procedures.1 Laeken prescribed two options for the Convention: either to present the European Council with a list of proposals for further consideration in an IGC; or to write a draft constitutional treaty. However, the political leaders did not anticipate the subsequent IGC being bound by either of these outcomes. Legitimacy is a critical resource for constitution-making and the Convention fared better in this regard than some governments, wary about having a constitution foisted on them, might have preferred. The fact that the Convention was a representative forum did confer a degree of authority that governments could hardly ignore. At the very least, it increased the pressure on governments to take note of, ‘to listen carefully to dominant and more resonant interests within the Convention itself’.2 The sheer novelty of the exercise enhanced the Convention’s credentials as a forum for constitutional deliberation. The wide-ranging membership brought a reflexivity to proceedings rare in EU forums, notwithstanding the presence and preferences of the leading member states throughout the proceedings.3 Discussion was remarkably candid, with evidence throughout of a thorough review of the issues, and a determination to resist pressure to fall in behind the ‘big three’.
